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Abstract
This paper analyses how worker optimism (and pessimism) affects subjective performance
evaluation (SPE) contracts. We let an optimistic (pessimistic) worker overestimate (underes-
timate) the probability of observing an acceptable performance. The firm is better informed
about performance than the worker and knows the worker’s bias. We show that optimism (and
pessimism): i) changes the optimal incentive scheme under SPE, ii) lowers the deadweight
loss associated with SPE contracts, iii) can lead to a Pareto improvement by simultaneously
lowering the firm’s expected wage cost and raising the worker’s expected compensation. In
addition, we show that worker pessimism can lead to SPE contracts without a deadweight
loss, in contrast to the standard case in the literature.
JEL Classification: D82 D84 D86 J41 J7
Keywords: Optimism, Overconfidence, Contract, Moral Hazard, Biased Beliefs, Mechanism Design.
1. Introduction
Most workers perform jobs in which objective performance measures are extremely
difficult to obtain (Prendergast, 1999). This is because very often the ultimate quality
of a worker’s performance, output or service is not directly observable. This happens
in the production of complex goods and services like movies, technological gadgets,
academic research papers or in the sports industry. In these types of jobs firms typi-
cally use subjective performance measures to provide work incentives like, for example,
subjective evaluations of supervisors, co-workers, or consumers.
The absence of objective performance measures creates a natural environment in
which biases like overconfidence and optimism may influence economic behaviour.1 In
this paper we ask how worker optimism and pessimism affects the optimal design of
1Felson (1981) and Dunning, Meyerowitz, and Holzberg (1989) show empirically that the more am-
biguous or subjective is the definition of an ability, the more individuals overestimate their relative
skills (a form of overconfidence). Van Den Steen (2004) and Santos-Pinto and Sobel (2005) pro-
vide mechanisms whereby an increase in subjectivity raises optimism and overconfidence. In general,
optimism is a well documented psychological phenomenon as we argue in section 3.2.
2subjective performance evaluation contracts (SPE). Is there a way for the employer
to take advantage of the worker’s bias? Does the worker lose or gain from being
optimistic/pessimistic? How does the presence of biased workers affect social welfare?
We provide precise answers to these questions and show that the SPE contracts offered
to biased workers may differ substantially (qualitatively and quantitatively) from those
offered to unbiased workers. For example, a firm may want to use a biased worker’s
self-evaluation to set compensation. This goes against the general recommendation in
the management literature to avoid the use of self-evaluations (or “self-assessment”)
in setting compensation (Milkovich, Newman, and Gerhart, 2011; Bratton and Gold,
2012), a practice that is, instead, widely used nowadays. This and other features of the
optimal contracts we derive lead to three main welfare results.
First, the principal may benefit by taking advantage of the bias of the worker in
order to decrease the cost of implementing high effort. That is, the principal is always
(at least weakly) better off when the worker is optimistic/pessimistic, compared to the
case of an unbiased worker. Second, optimism and pessimism lower the deadweight loss
of subjective performance evaluation contracts.2 Under some specific conditions, the
misalignment of beliefs between the principal and the agent may even lead to contracts
that feature no deadweight loss at all. Third, workers’ biases can lead to a Pareto
improvement by simultaneously lowering the firm’s expected wage cost and raising the
worker’s expected compensation. When the conditions for a Pareto improvement are
not met, however, the agent is always (at least weakly) worse off because of his bias.
In our model, we consider a contractual environment where a risk neutral employer
(or principal) offers a one-period contract to a risk neutral worker (or agent) who is
protected by limited liability. If the agent accepts the contract, he chooses an effort
level — high or low — to exert towards the realisation of a project which may or may
not be succesful. The probability that the project is a success is larger under high
effort than under low effort and the cost of exerting high effort is larger than the cost
of exerting low effort.
The effort choice of the agent as well as the outcome of the project are not directly
observable. However, the outcome of the project generates separate, private (and hence
subjective) signals for the principal and the agent. These signals represent the parties’
opinion about the performance of the project (and can be thought as sent by “nature”).
We assume that each signal only has two possible realizations: acceptable and unac-
ceptable performance. The signals are imperfectly positively correlated and the extent
to which performance evaluations are subjective depends on the degree of correlation
between the signals. The principal’s signal is more informative than that of the agent.
2Deadweight loss is a standard feature of SPE contracts (see the seminal paper MacLeod (2003) and
the literature we cite below) and is often also referred to as “money burning”.
3We focus on the case where the principal designs an incentive compatible contract
in order to implement high effort.3 A contract in our set-up specifies a wage cost for
the principal and a compensation for the agent under each possible pairs of reported
signals. The wage is the principal’s dollar cost of employing the agent and the compen-
sation is the dollar amount the agent receives. We allow the agent to costlessly impose
a deadweight loss upon the principal. This captures the notion of conflict in a relation-
ship, which might happen when the parties disagree on their performance evaluations.
For instance, the worker may decide to “punish” the employer by performing badly,
changing manager or even sabotaging future projects.4
In this framework, we let an optimistic (pessimistic) agent overestimates (underesti-
mates) the probability of observing an acceptable performance given the realization of
the principal’s signal. The principal is fully informed about the agent’s bias.
While optimism and pessimism already separate types of agents into two categories,
the fact that the worker has biased beliefs about his own signal’s distribution only also
affects the perceived correlation of signals. We distinguish between agents who perceive
signals to be positively correlated (as they actually are) and agents who (mistakenly)
perceive signals to be negatively correlated. This proves to be a key distinction since
the classical result on the existence of conflict and deadweight loss in SPE contracts
does not necessarily hold for the case of negative perceived correlation.
When the principal and the agent disagree only about the degree of the positive
correlation between signals, the principal can “speculate” on the compensation granted
to the agent. To do so she promises more (less) in states the agent deems more (less)
probable than she does. This alleviates the conflict present in the contract and may
lead to Pareto improvements compared to the case of an unbiased agent. It is not,
however, enough to rule out conflict entirely.
When the signal correlations perceived by two parties also differ in direction, not only
can the principal speculate on the states mentioned above, but now the states deemed
most probable by the two parties are exact opposites. This creates an incentive for the
principal to speculate even further. In face of a greater (believed) expected compensa-
tion, the agent may find it optimal to sign a contract that features no conflict and no
deadweight loss. Interestingly, this contract never leads to a Pareto improvement.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature
and compares it to our findings. Section 3 sets up the model, shows how we introduce
workers’ biases, formalizes the principal’s effort implementation problem, and states
3While we assume this purely because it is more realistic, one can always find a value for the successful
project such that the principal always wants to implement high effort as opposed to low effort.
4Mas (2006, 2008) provides direct evidence of employees imposing direct costs upon employers through
private actions. These costs include a decrease in future effort (Mas, 2006) or a direct reduction in the
quality of the output (Mas, 2008). However, there are also examples of employers imposing direct costs
upon employees. In the sports and entertainment businesses, athletes and performers (e.g., actors and
musicians) are often subject to fines or are not called up for a particular game or show.
4some basic features of optimal contracts in our set-up. Section 4 solves the model in
the presence of an optimistic agent while section 5 assumes a pessimistic agent. Section
6 solves the model in the presence of two further types of biased agents allowed by the
model. Section 7 presents a thorough welfare analysis of each of the new contracts
and discuss the main results on welfare and social value of workers’ biases. Section 8
concludes the paper. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2. Related Literature
Our paper contributes to the literature on subjective performance evaluation. Within
this literature the closest paper to ours is MacLeod (2003). He shows that when
signals are perfectly correlated the incentive constraints for the revelation of subjective
information are not binding and the optimal contract with subjective evaluation is
the same as the optimal principal-agent contract with verifiable information. In this
case there is no welfare loss due to the incentive constraints arising from subjective
evaluation. This is no longer the case when signals are imperfectly correlated. MacLeod
(2003) also shows that the agent’s ability to harm the principal is an essential input
into an optimal contract with subjective evaluation. Furthermore, MacLeod (2003)
shows that a higher level of correlation between the parties’ information reduces the
expected level of conflicts in an optimal contract.5
Our paper also contributes to the growing literature on the impact of biased beliefs on
the employment relationship.6 In accordance with our results, this literature highlights
further cases where workers’ optimism or overconfidence may have positive welfare im-
plications. Hvide (2002) shows that worker overconfidence about productivity outside
the firm improves worker welfare. Be´nabou and Tirole (2003) show that if a firm is
better informed about a worker’s skill than the worker, effort and overconfidence are
complements, then the firm has an incentive to boost the worker’s overconfidence by
offering low-powered incentives that signal trust to the worker and increase motivation.
Gervais and Goldstein (2007) find that a firm is better off with a team of workers who
overestimate their skill when there are complementarities between workers’ efforts. Fur-
ther, in this literature are a set of papers that, like ours, study the implications of the
presence of a biased agents on key contractual aspects. Santos-Pinto (2008, 2010) and
5More recently authors have investigated SPE contracts in several settings. Among others: Fuchs
(2007) looks at repeated moral hazard problems under SPE, Chan and Zheng (2011) study dynamic
contracting with SPE, Zabojnik (2014) shifts the attention on SPE as feedbacks rather than incentive
tools, Fuchs (2015) studies the connection between SPE and discretional bonuses, MacLeod and Tan
(2017) show respectively how malfeasance and the timing of the two parties’ SPE reporting have
strong impacts on optimal contracting. Finally, The literature on relational contracts (the seminal
contribution is due to Levin, 2003) has originated simultaneously and parallel to SPE contracting. This
literature investigates similar settings where compensation is tied to performance, but the performance
evaluation of the latter is not entirely objective.
6We will focus on papers that use the principal-agent framework to model the worker-firm relationship.
5De la Rosa (2011) show how firms can design objective performance evaluation con-
tracts to take advantage of worker overconfidence about productivity inside the firm.
Fang and Moscarini (2005) and Santos-Pinto (2012) show that worker overconfidence
can lead to wage compression inside and outside the firm, respectively.
Finally, our paper contributes to the literature on exploitative contracting. Section 7
provides conditions under which the new contracts we derive do not necessarily feature
an “exploitative nature” in the sense of making the principal better off and the agent
worse off (compared to the case of an unbiased agent). When these conditions aren’t
met, however, the principal does exploit the agent’s biased beliefs. Notable and related
contributions are Della Vigna and Malmendier (2004), Gabaix and Laibson (2006),
Eliaz and Spiegler (2008), Heidhues and Koszegi (2010), and Foschi (2017).7
3. A Binary Model of Subjective Evaluation
In this section we set-up the model, define an optimistic (pessimistic) agent, formalize
the principal’s problem, and describe some basic features of optimal contracts in our
set-up.
3.1. Set-up. A risk neutral principal (she) offers a one period contract to an agent
(he). If the agent accepts, he chooses effort λ ∈ {λL, λH}, where λ is the probability
that output Y is realized. We let 1 ≥ λH > λL ≥ 0. The net benefit to the principal is:
E(Π) = λY − E(w)
where w represents the dollar costs of employing the agent and return Y is always
strictly positive. We say that the result of the project is “good” (“bad”) if Y is (is not)
realized.
When the agent exerts effort λ, he obtains U(c, λ) = u(c) − V (λ), where c is the
compensation for his work and V (λ) is the cost of the effort exerted (with V (λH) >
V (λL) ≥ 0). In this paper we derive the optimal contract when the principal faces a
risk neutral agent and there is limited liability. Hence, we assume u(c) = c and c ≥ 0.
We also assume that the agent has access to an outside option granting him u.
Following MacLeod (2003), neither the outcome of the project nor the effort exerted
are observable. The outcome of the project generates separate private (and hence
subjective) signals for the principal and the agent. The principal observes a measure of
performance or signal T and the agent observes a measure of performance or signal S.
7Della Vigna and Malmendier (2004) show how firms can design contracts to take advantage of con-
sumers with quasi-hyperbolic preferences. Gabaix and Laibson (2006) show how firms can use base-
good and add-on pricing schemes to exploit consumers who are unaware of the existence of the add-on.
Eliaz and Spiegler (2008) study optimal dynamic contracting when agents are uncertain about their
own preferences (na¨ıve agents) at the time of signing the contract, and they may be more optimistic
than the principal about the better state occurring. Heidhues and Koszegi (2010) study exploitative
credit contracts. Foschi (2017) studies the design of optimal contracts for na¨ıve agents introducing
the assumption that na¨ıvete´ may depend on the same ability agents are trying to estimate.
6Signals T and S have realizations t ∈ {a, u} and s ∈ {a, u} respectively. Realization a
(u) corresponds to an “acceptable” (“unacceptable”) performance.8 In particular, we
let γGt = Pr{T = t|G} and γBt = Pr{T = t|B} be the probability that signal T results
in t ∈ {a, u} when the outcome of the project is good (G) or bad (B) respectively.
Assumption 1. Signal T is positively correlated with the outcome of the project. That
is:
γGa > γ
B
a and γ
G
u < γ
B
u
The realization of signal S is described as a function of T . Let Pts = Pr{S = s|T = t}.
The unconditional probability of realizations ts to occur together in state G and B are
γGts = Pr{T = t, S = s|G} = PtsγGt and γBts = Pr{T = t, S = s|B} = PtsγBt . This allows
us to derive the following probabilities, crucial for contracting:
γHts = Pr{T = t, S = s|λH} = λHγGts + (1− λH)γBts
γLts = Pr{T = t, S = s|λL} = λLγGts + (1− λL)γBts
Assumption 2. For any λj, signals are positively correlated in the following sense:
PaaPuu − PauPua > 0
This assumption implies that the principal’s signal is more informative than that
of the agent in the sense defined by Blackwell et al. (1951, 1953). Assumption 2 has
implications also on the conditional distributions of signals.
Lemma 1. Given the positive correlation of signals the following are true:
(i) γjts = Pts Pr [T = t|λj] ≡ PtsΓjt ,
(ii) γjaaγ
j
uu − γjauγjua > 0,
(iii) Paa > Pua and Puu > Pau.
(iv) ∆Γa + ∆Γu = 0, where ∆Γt = Γ
H
t − ΓLt .
3.2. The Origin of Disagreement. Managers, workers and more generally individ-
uals tend to have biased, and mostly optimistic, expectations about the future.9 To
8The model allows for two different interpretations. The acceptable or unacceptable performance may
be either the agent’s or the project’s overall.
9Most individuals tend to overestimate their chances of experiencing positive and underestimate their
chances of experiencing negative events (e.g. Weinstein, 1980; Taylor and Brown, 1988). Entrepreneurs,
managers and workers have been proven to often be optimistic about their financial outcomes (Arab-
sheibani, De Meza, Maloney, and Pearson, 2000) ant to show dispositional optimism (Koudstaal, Sloof,
and Van Praag, 2015).10 Optimism also matters for economic decisions like market entry, portfolio,
and career choices (e.g. Puri and Robinson, 2007). While optimistic biases are a robust and widespread
psychological phenomenon, pessimistic biases are rare. Still, some individuals tend to underestimate
7account for that, we assume that the agent and the principal agree to disagree on the
conditional distribution of S. In particular, we assume that, given that the principal
has observed T = t, the agent’s perceived probability of observing S = s is altered by
some amount bt.
Assumption 3. Regardless of the effort exerted, the agent has biased beliefs such that:
P˜aa = Paa + ba
P˜au = Pau − ba
P˜ua = Pua + bu
P˜uu = Puu − bu
where
ba ∈ [−Paa, Pau] bu ∈ [−Pua, Puu] .11
This modelling of the bias is more general than it seems at first glance and it allows
us to study several different forms of bias observed in the lab. To distinguish among
these cases we present the following definitions. Of course the list of cases we are going
to study is not exhaustive. We start by stating the definition of agent optimism (and
pessimism) in this model.
Definition 1. The agent is “ optimistic” if he overestimates the probability that his
signal is acceptable given the realisation of the principal’s signal, i.e., if ba and bu are
positive.
Definition 2. The agent is “ pessimistic” if he underestimates the probability that his
signal is acceptable given the realisation of the principal’s signal, i.e., if ba and bu are
negative.
The cases of agents with biases such that bu < 0 < ba and ba < 0 < bu, that we define
as “trusty” and “skeptical” respectively, are studied later on in section 6.
As described in its definition, the nature of optimism is for an agent to overestimate
the probability that his performance is deemed “acceptable.” In fact, denoting the
biased probabilistic beliefs of the agent with P˜r{·}, from basic probability theory we
get:
P˜r{S = a|λj} =P˜r{S = a|T = a}Pr{T = a|λj}+ P˜r{S = a|T = u}Pr{T = u|λj}
=P˜aaΓ
j
a + P˜uaΓ
j
u
= Pr{S = a|λj}+ baΓja + buΓju
their chances of experiencing positive events and overestimate their chances of experiencing negative
ones. Carver, Scheier, and Segerstrom (2010) review the literature on optimism and show how “it is
[...] possible to identify people who are pessimists in an absolute sense” and that “doing this reveals
that pessimists are a minority”.
11The posed boundaries are needed for all P˜ts ∈ [0, 1] to hold.
8which is increasing in both ba and bu for any j = H,L.
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A second aspect that needs attention is how the bias of the agent affects his beliefs
about the correlation between the two signals. Overconfidence in calibration is another
well documented psychological phenomenon. Most people, even experts, overestimate
the precision of their estimates and forecasts (Oskamp, 1965; Fischhoff, Slovic, and
Lichtenstein, 1977; Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips, 1982; Wallsten, Budescu, and
Zwick, 1993; Barberis and Thaler, 2003). Overconfidence is important in personal and
business decisions (e.g. Russo and Schoemaker, 1992; Grubb, 2009). Overconfidence
also matters for investment and financial decisions. Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrah-
manyam (1998, 2001) show that overconfidence can lead to excess volatility and to
predictability of stock returns. Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) show that it can lead to
financial bubbles. While the majority of individuals are overconfident, a minority is
underconfident.
Definition 3. The agent is overconfident if he overestimates the correlation between
signals, i.e., if
P˜aaP˜uu − P˜auP˜ua ≥ PaaPuu − PauPua ⇒ ba > bu. (1)
Definition 4. The agent is underconfident if he underestimates the correlation between
signals, i.e., if bu > ba.
An agent’s level and direction of confidence has implication on the believed direction
of the correlation between signals. Given Assumption 2, an overconfident agent always
believes signals to be positively correlated. An underconfident agent, instead, may
underestimate the correlation between signals to the point of believing that T and S
are negatively correlated. Given Lemma 1, an effort level λj, biases ba and bu imply
the following for every t:
γ˜jta = P˜taΓ
j
t = (Pta + bt)Γ
j
t
γ˜jtu = P˜tuΓ
j
t = (Ptu − bt)Γjt
Lemma 2. Given Assumption 2, when an agent has a bias that satisfies:
bu − ba ≤ Paa − Pua, (2)
he believes that signals are positively correlated, i.e., P˜aaP˜uu − P˜auP˜ua > 0.
12An alternative formulation for the bias would be to simply let
P˜r{S = a|λj} = Pr{S = a|λj}+ b.
An alternative definition of optimism emerges. One could, in fact, define an optimistic agent as one
where baΓ
j
a + buΓ
j
u = b > 0. Our formulation and definition, however, is more general and allows for
the study of more complicated beliefs.
9If (2) fails, a biased agent has beliefs that satisfy γ˜jaaγ˜
j
uu − γ˜jauγ˜jua < 0 and expects
signals to be negatively correlated.
To complete our classification of the types of bias, notice that an optimistic (pes-
simistic) agent can be either over or underconfident depending on the parameters.13
3.3. The Principal’s Effort Implementation Problem. In the model, a contract
is a set {wts, cts}t,s∈{a,u}, where both the agent’s compensation, c, and the principal’s
dollar cost of employing the agent, w, may depend on the realization of T and S. The
principal is assumed to be perfectly informed about the agent’s biased beliefs. The
objective of the principal is to incentivize the agent to exert the level of effort that
maximizes profits. Following Grossman and Hart (1983), we know that this problem
can be divided in two steps. First, deriving the minimum cost E∗(w|λ) of implementing
a certain λ and then solving maxλ λY − E∗(w|λ). The rest of this paper is focused on
minimizing the cost of implementing the high level of effort for different types of agents.
By the revelation principle, it is sufficient to consider only contracts where both
parties have an incentive to reveal their private information in equilibrium. Hence, the
principal faces the following constrained minimization problem:
min
{wts,cts}t,s∈{u,a}
waaγ
H
aa + wauγ
H
au+wuaγ
H
ua + wuuγ
H
uu (3)
s.t.
∑
ts
ctsγ˜
H
ts−V (λH) ≥ u¯ (PC)∑
ts
ctsγ˜
H
ts − V (λH) ≥
∑
ts
ctsγ˜
L
ts − V (λL) (IC)
waaγ
H
aa + wauγ
H
au ≤ wuaγHaa + wuuγHau (TRaP )
wuaγ
H
ua + wuuγ
H
uu ≤ waaγHua + wauγHuu (TRuP )
caaγ˜
H
aa + cuaγ˜
H
ua ≥ cauγ˜Haa + cuuγ˜Hua (TRaA)
cauγ˜
H
au + cuuγ˜
H
uu ≥ caaγ˜Hau + cuaγ˜Huu (TRuA)
wts ≥ cts ≥ 0 ∀t, s ∈ {a, u}. (LLts)
The first two constraints are the classical participation and incentive compatibility
constraint. They ensure that the agent is willing to accept the contract, (PC), and
to exert high effort instead of low effort, (IC). Constraints (TRtP ) are called truthful
reporting constraints for the principal, they ensure that she is willing to truthfully report
t when she observes T = t. Similarly, (TRsA) are the truthful reporting constraints for
the agent, they ensure that he is willing to truthfully report s when he observes S = s.
Notice that this implies an important distinction. The realisations of signals, t and s,
13We show later on that, given our assumptions, the only type of agent who is always overconfident is
the trusty type. Further, optimistic, pessimistic, and skeptical agents can all believe that correlation
is negative, under some parameter conditions.
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are not necessarily equal to the performance evaluation reported to the other party.
Hereafter we use the word “signal” to indicate the actual realisation of T and S and
“Performance Evaluation report” (PE report) to indicate the reported value of his/her
own signal by one party to the other. The TR constraints ensure that the two coincide
in equilibrium.14 Last, is a set of four constraints that ensure limited liability on the
side of the agent (cts ≥ 0) and feasibility (wts ≥ cts).
Before deriving the optimal contract for the different types of agent, let us state the
final assumption of our model. We require u¯ to be small enough. This assumption
implies that (PC) is satisfied and improves the tractability of the problem.
Assumption 4. Let
u¯ ≤ V (λ
H)ΓLa − V (λL)ΓHa
∆Γa
(4)
Given Assumption 4, and the limited liability assumption, the (IC) implies that the
(PC) is satisfied. Therefore we disregard the (PC) in the solution of the problem and
check that it holds afterwards. We present this in Corollary 1.
min
{wts,cts}t,s∈{u,a}
waaγ
H
aa+wauγ
H
au + wuaγ
H
ua + wuuγ
H
uu (5)
s.t.
∑
ts
ctsγ˜
H
ts − V (λH) ≥
∑
ts
ctsγ˜
L
ts − V (λL) (IC)
waaγ
H
aa + wauγ
H
au ≤ wuaγHaa + wuuγHau (TRaP )
wuaγ
H
ua + wuuγ
H
uu ≤ waaγHua + wauγHuu (TRuP )
caaγ˜
H
aa + cuaγ˜
H
ua ≥ cauγ˜Haa + cuuγ˜Hua (TRaA)
cauγ˜
H
au + cuuγ˜
H
uu ≥ caaγ˜Hau + cuaγ˜Huu (TRuA)
wts ≥ cts ≥ 0 ∀t, s ∈ {a, u}. (LLts)
Before splitting the analysis for the resulting optimal contract for each type of biased
agent, we present a set of findings on problem (5) which are valid for biased as well as
for unbiased agents.
3.4. Basic Features of Optimal Contracts. In order for the truthful reporting
constraints to hold, it cannot be always optimal for a party to report a certain PE.
To see this, consider an agent who observes S = a. If both caa ≥ cau and cua ≥ cuu
with at least one holding with inequality, it is always optimal for the agent to report a,
regardless of the actual realization. Hence, in order for the (TRA) constraints to hold,
the two inequalities cannot have the same (strict) sign. A similar discussion holds for
14Technically we define tˆ and sˆ as the PE report. Since the TR ensures that tˆ = t and sˆ = s we omit
this notation in order not to complicate the exposition.
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the principal and wages. Since the principal wants to pay the lowest possible wage, the
direction of the inequalities must be such that the wages are the lowest when the PE
report are identical, i.e., t = s, the most probable outcome (under truthful reporting)
given that signals are positively correlated. This produces the following Lemma.
Lemma 3. Given Assumption 2, any optimal contract implementing high effort features
either (i) wua = waa and wau = wuu or (ii) wua > waa and wau > wuu.
Similarly, since the agent wants to obtain the highest possible compensation, if he
believes signals are positively correlated, then the direction of the inequalities must to
be such that the compensations are the highest when t = s, the most probable believed
outcome.
Lemma 4. If the agent believes signals are positively correlated, i.e. (2) holds, then any
optimal contract implementing high effort features either (i) caa = cau and cuu = cua or
(ii) caa > cau and cuu > cua.
These first two Lemmas are already enough for us to state the first Proposition of
the model, which confirms one of the main results of MacLeod (2003) for an agent who
believes signals are positively correlated, namely, that unless there is a deadweight loss
it is impossible to implement high effort.
Proposition 1. If the principal wishes to implement high effort and the agent believes
signals are positively correlated, then there ought to exist at least one combination of
realizations of t and s where wts > cts.
To understand fully Proposition 1 notice that intuitively the principal always has the
incentive to report that the performance of the project (and of the agent) is unaccept-
able, while the agent always has the incentive to report the opposite. If the principal
and the agent play a constant sum game, these incentives are the only ones present
and truthful reporting becomes impossible. We define the expected deadweight loss
from using a subjective performance evaluation contract that implements high effort
as
∑
ts(wts − cts)γHts .
As one of the main results of our paper shows, however, Proposition 1 does not
always hold for an agent who believes signals are negatively correlated. The basic
characteristics of the contract, in fact, change as outlined in Lemma 5 below and
produce the findings studied in section 4.2 and following.
Lemma 5. If the agent believes signals are negatively correlated, i.e., (2) fails to hold,
then any optimal contract implementing high effort features either (i) caa = cau and
cuu = cua or (ii) caa < cau and cuu < cua.
Lemma 4 shows that if the agent believes signals are positively correlated, then the
principal might opt for designing an optimal contract where, taking as given her PE
12
report, the compensation is higher in the agreement cases than in the disagreement
cases, i.e., a contract with caa > cau and cuu > cua. Lemma 5 shows that the opposite
happens when the agent believes signals are negatively correlated. In this case the
principal might opt for designing a contract where, taking as given her PE report, the
compensation is higher in the disagreement cases than in the agreement cases, i.e., a
contract with caa < cau and cuu < cua. This follows the exact opposite intuition of
Lemma 4.
4. Optimal Contracting with an Optimistic Agent
In this section we derive the optimal contract for an optimistic agent. We separate
the analysis into two subcases: an optimistic agent who believes signals are positively
correlated and one who believes signals are negatively correlated.
4.1. Optimistic Agent who Believes Signals are Positively Correlated. We
start by considering the case of an optimistic agent who believes signals are positively
correlated. This happens when
ba > 0, bu > 0, and bu − ba ≤ Paa − Pua.
Note that an optimistic agent who believes signals are positively correlated is under-
confident when ba < bu and overconfident when ba > bu.
In order to solve problem (5) when the agent believes signals are positively correlated
we present a set of Lemmas in the appendix that select the binding constraints for this
case and reduce the choice variables of the problem to simply: caa and cau. All together
this reduces the problem to:
min
caa,cau
caa[(γ
H
aa)
2γ˜Huu + γ
H
aaγ
H
uaγ˜
H
uu + γ˜
H
auγ
H
uuγ
H
aa − γ˜HauγHauγHua]
+ cau
(
γHaaγ
H
auγ˜
H
uu + γ
H
auγ
H
uaγ˜
H
uu − γ˜HauγHuuγHaa + γ˜HauγHauγHua
)
(6)
s.t. caa
(
∆γ˜aa +
γ˜Hau
γ˜Huu
∆γ˜uu
)
+ cau
(
∆γ˜au −
γ˜Hau
γ˜Huu
∆γ˜uu
)
≥ ∆V (IC)
caa ≤
(
1 +
γ˜Huu
γ˜Hau
)
cau (7)
caa ≥ cau, (8)
where ∆V = V (λH) − V (λL). The last two conditions ensure that (TRuP ) and (TRaA)
hold respectively. If they hold with equality, the corresponding constraint is binding.
The next Proposition presents a condition that selects the binding constraints of (6).
Compared to the Lemmas in the appendix, this Proposition is far more important.
Combined with Proposition 3, it presents a result original to our model. That is,
as we show later, the existence of a new contract where the principal’s wage cost is
only determined by the agent’s performance evaluation, as opposed to the baseline
13
contract in the literature where the wage is determined by both parties’ performance
evaluations.
Proposition 2. Let the agent believe that signals are positively correlated. If the agent
has beliefs that satisfy:
bu ≤ Puu −
(Pau − ba)
(
1− ΓHa
)
ΓHa (Paa − Pua)
(ba − PauΓHa ) (PaaΓHa + PuaΓHu )
(9)
then the optimal contract implementing high effort features caa > cau, (TR
a
A) slack
and (TRuP ) binding. If the agent has beliefs that violate (9), then the optimal contract
implementing high effort features caa = cau, (TR
a
A) binding and (TR
u
P ) slack.
Proposition 2 follows from a graphical analysis of the problem. Figure 1 below shows
the three constraints binding in (cau, caa) space and highlights the set of contracts
satisfying all constraints of (6) — and therefore of (3).
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Figure 1. The shaded area represents the set of contracts satisfying all
the constraints of (3).
In order to understand whether at optimum it is the (TRaA) or the (TR
u
P ) that bind,
and therefore where does the optimal contract lie in Figure 1, we study the sign and
magnitude of the slope of the iso-costs and the (IC). Hence, Proposition 2 shows that
the optimal contract lies either at point X or Y of Figure 1 depending on the how do
the slope of the (IC) and of iso-cost compare.
From this analysis we can also derive the optimal contract offered to an unbiased
agent, which we refer to as the Baseline Performance Evaluation (BPE) contract
{w∗ts, c∗ts}t,s=a,u.
14
Proposition 3 (BPE Contract). If the agent has unbiased beliefs, then the optimal
contract implementing high effort is given by:
w∗aa = c
∗
aa w
∗
au = c
∗
aa w
∗
uu = 0 w
∗
ua =
c∗aa
Paa
c∗aa =
∆V
∆Γa
c∗au = c
∗
aa c
∗
uu = 0 c
∗
ua = 0.
The BPE contract features:
(i) a compensation that only depends on the principal’s PE report;
(ii) a positive compensation when the principal reports an acceptable performance
and no compensation otherwise;
(iii) a wage cost that depends on both parties’ PE reports;
(iv) the highest wage cost when the principal reports an unacceptable performance
and the agent reports an acceptable performance;
(v) a deadweight loss when the principal reports an unacceptable performance and
the agent reports an acceptable performance;
The above replicates the standard result of the literature with unbiased agents (a` la
MacLeod, 2003) and it provides us with a basis of comparison for the contracts derived
hereafter. The key features of the BPE contract are as follows. First, the agent’s
compensation depends only on the principal’s PE report. Second, the principal’s wage
cost depends on both parties’ PE reports. Third, there is a deadweight loss when the
principal deems unacceptable a performance deemed acceptable by the agent.
The fact that in a BPE contract the agent’s compensation only depends on the
principal’s PE report is due to Holmstro¨m’s informativeness principle. According to
Holmstro¨m (1979) T is a sufficient statistic for the pair (T, S) with respect to effort
λ if f(t, s;λ) = g(t, s)h(t, λ) for almost every (t, s).15 This is true in our set-up since
γjts = Pts[λ
jγtG + (1 − λj)γtB]. In other words, T carries all the relevant information
about effort λ, and S adds nothing to the power of inference about λ (even though
S is positively correlated with T ). Hence, if Y , T , and S were all observable and
verifiable (they were objective performance measures), then only Y and T would be
used in a contract in order to incentivize the agent. In our model Y , T , and S are
neither observable nor verifiable, however, truth telling by both parties, implies that
the principal’s PE report, Tˆ , is a sufficient statistic for the pair of PE reports, (Tˆ , Sˆ),
with respect to the agent’s effort choice λ. The agent’s PE report does not add to the
15Notice that Holmstro¨m (1979) assumes a moral hazard problem with a risk-averse agent. Chaigneau,
Edmans, and Gottlieb (2014) extend the result to a model with limited liability and show that under
risk-neutrality the principle still holds. They also show that the conditions for a signal to be of “zero
value” to contracting are different from the standard informativeness principle. A signal can be of
zero value even when it carries information about states where the agent obtains no compensation,
which holds in our model.
15
power of inference about λ and hence should not be used to compensate the agent. The
principal should only use her PE report to compensate the agent.
We now explain why, in a BPE contract, the principal’s wage cost depends on both
parties’ PE reports. The principal wishes to minimize the expected wage cost and, for
possible combination of PE reports, the wage cost must be greater or equal than the
agent’s compensation. Since the agent’s compensation only depends on the principal’s
PE it is not surprising that the principal’s wage cost also depends on the principal’s
PE. But, why does the principal’s wage cost also depend on the agent’s PE? In a
BPE contract there is a deadweight loss when the principal deems unacceptable a
performance deemed acceptable by the agent. This deadweight loss ensures that the
principal has an incentive to reveal acceptable PEs that result in higher compensation
for the agent. Otherwise, the principal would always report unacceptable PEs and
the agent, knowing this, would exert low effort. Hence, the agent’s PE is valuable
as it facilitates truthful subjective evaluation by the principal. Truthful subjective
evaluation by both parties allows the principal to implement high effort which leaves
both parties better off than if low effort is implemented.16
Now that we have seen why the deadweight loss takes place let’s discuss why it
happens following (t, s) = (u, a) and not in other cases. First, notice that the principal
wants to punish the agent in the lowest state, that is, when the principal’s PE is
unacceptable, t = u. This is the state where a deviation to low effort is more likely
to have occurred. Second, since the signals are positively correlated, a deadweight loss
following (t, s) = (u, u) would be suboptimal, since it would take place more often than
following (t, s) = (u, a). Finally, we know from Proposition 1 that the deadweight loss
is a necessary condition for truthful reporting. If the deadweight loss were not in place,
the principal (agent) would have the dominant strategy of reporting the performance
as unacceptable (acceptable). Hence, it happens after (t, s) = (u, a) in order to take
both parties away from their dominant strategy.
Next we present a set of results that show how, in the presence of an optimistic agent,
the principal may find it optimal to offer the agent either the baseline contract or a
new contract that makes different use of information and takes advantage of the agent’s
bias — which we call the Agent’s Performance Evaluation (APE) contract. The APE
contract is original to the present model.
Proposition 4. If the agent is optimistic, believes signals are positively correlated,
and has beliefs that violate (9), then the optimal contract implementing high effort is
given by {w′ts, c′ts}t,s=a,u where both wages and compensations equal the ones of the BPE
contract, i.e., c′ts = c
∗
ts and w
′
ts = w
∗
ts ∀t, s = a, u.
16According to Holmstro¨m (1979), pp.83: “A signal y is said to be valuable if both the principal and
the agent can be made strictly better off with a contract of the form s(x, y) than they are with a
contract of the form s(x).”
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Proposition 4 shows that the optimal contract for an optimistic agent is the same
as that for an unbiased agent when the optimistic agent believes signals are positively
correlated and his bias is small.
Now suppose (9) holds. In this case the APE {w†ts, c†ts}t,s=a,u is set at optimum. This
new contract differs qualitatively from the BPE contract as we discuss below.17
Proposition 5 (APE Contract). If the agent is optimistic, believes signals are posi-
tively correlated, and has beliefs that satisfy (9), then the optimal contract implementing
high effort {w†ts, c†ts}t,s=a,u is given by:
w†aa = c
†
aa w
†
au = c
†
au w
†
uu = c
†
au w
†
ua = c
†
aa
c†aa = c
†
au
(
1 + γ˜
H
uu
γ˜Hau
)
c†au =
∆V
∆Γa
P˜auΓHa
P˜auΓHa +P˜uu(P˜aa−ΓHa )
c†uu = c
†
au c
†
ua = 0.
The APE contract features:
(i) a compensation that depends on both parties’ PE reports;
(ii) the highest compensation when both parties report an acceptable performance;
(iii) a wage cost that only depends of the agent’s PE report;
(iv) a high wage when the agent reports an acceptable performance and a low wage
otherwise;
(v) a smaller deadweight loss (than in a BPE contract) when the principal reports
an unacceptable performance and the agent reports an acceptable performance.
Proposition 5 shows that if the optimistic agent believes that signals are positively
correlated and his bias is “large”, then the optimal contract is very different from the
BPE contract described in Proposition 4. First, the agent’s compensation depends on
both parties’ PE reports. Second, the principal’s wage cost only depends on the agent’s
PE report. Third, the agent’s optimism reduces the deadweight loss associated with
SPE contracts. Next we provide the economic intuition behind these key differences.
In the BPE contract in Proposition 4 the agent’s compensation only depends on the
principal’s PE report. In contrast, in the APE contract in Proposition 5 the agent’s
compensation depends on both parties’ PE reports. On the one hand, we still have the
old effect, namely, the fact that the principal’s PE report is a sufficient statistic for the
pair of PE reports with respect to the agent’s effort choice. This implies that, in the
absence of a difference of opinion between the principal and the agent, the principal
would only want to use the principal’s PE report to compensate the agent. However,
the existence of a sufficiently large difference of opinion (i.e., the agent’s optimistic bias
satisfies (9)), implies that the principal also wants to use the agent’s PE report to com-
pensate the agent. This happens because the agent’s PE report allows the principal to
17Notice that, if condition (9) holds with equality, the slopes of the IC and isocosts are identical and
the problem has many solutions. In particular any point lying between X and Y in Figure 1 solves
problem (6). At this point of indifference, we assume the principal sets up a APE contract.
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exploit the agent’s bias. By cleverly manipulating the compensation and the wage cost
according to the agent’s bias, the principal is able to simultaneously raise the agent’s
perceived expected compensation and lower her expected wage cost. The principal does
this by increasing the agent’s compensation when both parties deem the performance
acceptable, a state overestimated by the agent, and lowering the agent’s compensa-
tion when the principal deems acceptable a performance deemed unacceptable by the
agent, a state underestimated by the agent. The optimal compensation in Proposition
5 results from this trade-off between informational efficiency and exploitation of the
agent’s bias.
In the BPE contract in Proposition 4 the principal’s wage cost depends on both
parties’ PEs. Moreover, the only role played by the agent’s PE report is to provide in-
centives for truthful revelation by the principal through the imposition of a deadweight
loss when the principal reports as unacceptable a performance reported as acceptable
by the agent. In other words, the threat of conflict ensures that the principal has an
incentive to reveal favourable observations that result in higher compensation to the
agent. Hence, the possibility of a deadweight loss makes the agent’s PE report valuable
in the sense of Holmstro¨m (1979). In contrast, in the APE contract in Proposition 5
the principal’s wage cost only depends on the agent’s PE report. In this contract the
agent’s PE report is still valuable in the sense of Holmstro¨m (1979). However, when the
optimistic agent believes that signals are positively correlated and his bias is large, i.e.,
condition (9) holds, the principal can decrease her expected cost of implementing high
effort by increasing the correlation between the wage and the agent’s PE report. She
does so by increasing the wage when both parties report an acceptable performance,
a state overestimated by the agent, and lowering the wage when the principal reports
an acceptable performance and the agent reports an unacceptable performance, a state
underestimated by the agent. The principal exploits the agent’s bias maximally by
making the wage depend only on the agent’s PE report.
Point (v) of Proposition 5 states that the APE contract leads to a smaller deadweight
loss than the BPE contract. As stated, the deadweight loss creates the threat of conflict
in order to ensure that the principal truthfully reports her own signal. When the agent’s
bias is particularly large, however, the principal is willing to offer a contract tailored
to the agent’s signals and beliefs (in order to take advantage of them). The contract
is tied mostly to the agent’s opinion, that is, the principal is “giving in” to the agent
at the contracting stage. This ensures that the agent is happy to sign a contract with
a less threatening conflict, since his opinion and report is going to drive the economic
interaction almost fully. Furthermore, notice that while the BPE contract sets the TRaP
binding it leaves the TRuP slack. On the contrary, the APE contract features both TRP
binding. In other words, the smaller threat of the APE decreases the principal’s truth-
telling incentives to a point where both constraints become binding. If the deadweight
18
loss following reports (t, s) = (u, a) were to decrease even further, the principal would
not be reporting truthfully his opinion any longer.
Finally, the APE contract provides a surprising result: when the agent is optimistic
enough, the principal uses the agent’s self-evaluation as an input to set the agent’s com-
pensation. This goes against the general recommendation in the management literature
against the use of self-evaluations to set compensation.
In order to fully describe and study the optimal contract we now present a graphical
representation of the feasible portion of (ba, bu) space for an optimistic agent. Figure 2
below identifies the type of contract an optimistic agent is offered for any value of his
bias. The ba > bu condition (that ensures overconfidence) is represented by the dotted
45◦ line. From the Figure, we see that the area where the APE is set optimally crosses
the ba = bu line. In the proof of Proposition (5) we formally prove the shape of the
area where the APE contract is set up.
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Underconfidence
BPE
Figure 2. The area delimited by the solid curve on the right in the
figure identifies the portion of the parameter space where a contract of
the type described in Proposition 5 is set optimally. That is, when the
presence of optimism generates a new contract compared to the case of
an unbiased agent. The two dotted lines crossing the quadrant represent
the condition for overconfidence (the one below) and the condition for
beliefs to satisfy (2) (the one above). This specific graph was obtained
for
(
Paa, Puu,Γ
H
a
)
= (0.6, 0.5, 0.6). Its shape, however generalises to all
feasible parameter values. The size and position of the area where the
APE contract is offered is unaltered.
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First of all, notice that when bu = 0 and ba = Pau the agent believes that there is
no chance that he will receive a signal of an unacceptable performance conditional on
the principal deeming it acceptable, i.e., he believes that conditional on T = a, S = u
is not possible. Upon observing S = u, he believes fully his signal’s realization and
thinks that the principal has observed exactly the same. Intuitively, this is the case
where the principal can exploit the most the agent’s optimism. The agent, in fact,
has no “suspicion” that the principal may have observed a, while in reality this may
very well be the case. Hence, as we show in section 7, the agent’s compensation for an
acceptable performance becomes cheaper with an APE contract compared to a BPE
contract (c†au < c
∗
au).
4.2. Optimistic Agent who Believes Signals are Negatively Correlated. Con-
sider now the case of an optimistic agent who believes that signals are negatively
correlated. This happens when
ba > 0, bu > 0, and bu − ba > Paa − Pua.
Note that an agent which such a bias is always underconfident since bu−ba > Paa−Pua
and Paa > Pua imply bu > ba.
In this case, the compensation scheme of the contract has to subdue to different
properties in order to satisfy truthful reporting. In the previous section we proved, in
fact, that Lemma 4 does not hold any longer. On the contrary, the optimal contract
must satisfy Lemma 5.
In order to solve problem (5) when the agent believes signals are negatively correlated
we present a set of Lemmas in the appendix that select the binding constraints for this
case and reduce the problem to:
min
{wts,cts}t,s∈{u,a}
caaγ
H
aa+wauγ
H
au + wuaγ
H
ua (10)
s.t. caaP˜aa+cau
(
P˜au − ΓHa
)
>
∆V
∆Γa
ΓHu (IC)
wau
Pau
Paa
≤ (wua − caa) (TRaP )
(wua − caa) ≤ wauPuu
Pua
(TRuP )
cau ≥ caa (TRuA)
wua ≥ cua ≥ 0 (LLua)
wau ≥ cau ≥ 0. (LLau)
The study of the solution of (10) is longer and more complicated than the solutions
to (6). First of all, notice that this time we have cuu = 0 (Lemma 14 in appendix 9).
When the agent believes signals to be negatively correlated the agreement payoffs (i.e.,
20
the ones following T = S) are now surprising for an agent. In particular if the agent
observes S = u, he believes that the principal has observed T = a and is not easily
convinced that T = u instead.
The first implication of the above, is that the proof of Proposition 1 does not hold any
longer. That is, under some conditions, the bias of an agent who believes signals to be
negatively correlated is such that the existence of a deadweight loss is not a necessary
condition for the implementation of high effort any longer. Further, as we show later,
there exists a portion of the parameter space where the optimal contract does not,
in fact, feature any deadweight loss. This is, however, not the case for an optimistic
agent. While there may exist equilibrium contracts different from the standard one for
an agent with beliefs violating (2), they are never optimal when the agent is optimistic.
Proposition 6. If the agent is optimistic and believes signals are negatively correlated,
then he is assigned the BPE contract.
In the proof of Proposition 6 we show how the conditions for potential new contracts
to be assigned can never be satisfied if the agent is optimistic and believes signals are
negatively correlated.
5. Optimal Contracting with a Pessimistic Agent
In this section we derive the optimal contract for a pessimistic agent. We separate
the analysis into two subcases: a pessimistic agent who believes signals are positively
correlated and one who believes signals are negatively correlated.
5.1. Pessimistic Agent who Believes Signals are Positively Correlated. A pes-
simistic agent who believes signals are positively correlated has beliefs such that
ba < 0, bu < 0, and bu − ba ≤ Paa − Pua.
Note that Lemmas 3 and 4 and Proposition 1 hold for this case.
Proposition 7. A pessimistic agent who believes signals are positively correlated is
always offered the BPE contract.
5.2. Pessimistic Agent who Believes Signals are Negatively Correlated. A
pessimistic agent who believes signals are negatively correlated has beliefs such that
ba < 0, bu < 0, and bu − ba > Paa − Pua.
Following up on the discussion started in section 4.2 we show how the optimal con-
tract in this case can take two new forms: the Disagreement Performance Evaluation
Deadweight Loss (DPE-DL) contract and the Disagreement Performance Evaluation
21
No Deadweight Loss (DPE-NDL) contract. We are going to present each new contract
in a Proposition.18
As already anticipated in section 4.2, when the agent believes that signals are neg-
atively correlated, the existence of a deadweight loss is not a necessary condition for
the implementation of high effort any longer. It can, however, still be take place under
certain conditions, as the next result shows.
Proposition 8 (DPE-DL Contract). If the agent is pessimistic, believes signals are
negatively correlated, and has beliefs that satisfy
buPauΓ
H
u − baPaaΓHa ≥ P 2aaΓHa − PauPuaΓHu (11)
and
ba < −PaaΓHA , (12)
then the optimal contract implementing high effort {wˆts, cˆts}t,s=a,u is given by:
wˆaa = 0 wˆau = cˆau wˆuu = 0 wˆua =
Pau
Paa
cˆau
cˆaa = 0 cˆau =
∆V
∆Γa
ΓHu
P˜au−ΓHa
cˆuu = 0 cˆua =
γ˜Haa
γ˜Hua
cˆau.
The DPE-DL contract features:
(i) a wage and compensation that depend on both parties’ PE reports;
(ii) a deadweight loss when the principal reports an unacceptable performance and
the agent reports an acceptable performance (unless (11) holds with equality);
(iii) a wage and a compensation only when the parties report misaligned performance
evaluations.
This result shows that if the pessimistic agent believes that signals are negatively
correlated and has a “large” bias, then the optimal contract is very different from the
BPE contract described in Proposition 4. First, the principal’s wage cost and the
agent’s compensation depend on both parties’ performance evaluations. Second, wage
and compensation are positive only when the parties disagree on their performance
evaluations. Next we provide the economic intuition behind the DPE-DL contract.
When the agent believes that signals are negatively correlated two very similar and
connected effects take place: (i) he believes “au” and “ua” more probable than “aa”
and “uu” (at least jointly) and (ii) his believed most probable events are the symmetric
opposite of the ones believed by the principal. Hence, it is straightforward to see why
a pessimistic agent who believes that signals are negatively correlated never accepts a
APE contract. First, he rarely expects to obtain c†aa. Second, he is not willing any longer
to accept a contract that features cua = 0. Similarly to the APE contract, the principal
can take advantage of this in order to decrease the expected wage paid. She can
18The proofs are presented as one in the appendix.
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“speculate” on the misalignment of beliefs by increasing (decreasing) the compensation
of the agent in states he wrongly deems more (less) probable than she does. Because
of (ii), the principal is therefore happy to offer the agent a positive cua and a larger
cau (compared to the BPE case) in exchange for a lower caa and/or cuu.
19 The fact
that they do not disagree only on the extent of the correlation any longer but now
also on the direction of it, opens up to a “stronger” manipulation of the standard
contract, compared to the switch from BPE to APE. This is behind the result that
caa = cuu = 0.
Obviously, the above has to be feasible, i.e. the agent has to be biased enough to
accept such a manipulation compared to the BPE contract, and optimal, i.e. the DPE
contract has to implement high effort at a lower cost. These are precisely the meanings
of condition (11) and (12). Condition (11) requires the agent to be biased enough
to accept a DPE contract while (12) requires the agent to be biased enough for the
principal to find it optimal to offer a DPE contract. To better understand the meaning
of, and intuitions behind the, conditions let us represent them in in (ba, bu) space.
Start by noticing that (11) may imply (12) under some parameter conditions, but
the reverse is never true. Figure 3 represents the two conditions for the case of(
Paa, Puu,Γ
H
a
)
= (0.7, 0.5, 0.6).20
Condition (12) poses a restriction only on ba, requiring it to be negative and low
enough. Intuitively, the “more negative” is ba the lower is P˜aa and the less the agent
expects (T, S) = (a, a) to take place. When (12) holds, the bias of the agent is such
that the principal has the incentive to speculate as described above. In other words,
P˜au is large enough for her to be able to offer a new contract with a lower caa and higher
cau satisfying all the constraints of the problem. Whether the agent sees through this
“deception” or not, depends on the restrictions posed on ba and bu by (11).
While a negative enough ba ensure the profitability of a DPE contract, the agent
may reject such a contract if his bu is negative or in general low enough. To see this,
notice that the smaller is bu, the less the agent expects (T, S) = (u, a) to take place,
an the more he expects (T, S) = (u, u) to take place. Since the (T, S) = (u, u) grants
him a zero compensation under a DPE contract, the latter becomes unfeasible. Hence,
for a given (negative) ba the agent has to have a large enough bu. To see why this is
reflected in the Figure, consider the area where the DPE-DL is set in Figure 3 (and
also in Figure 5 and 6 in section 6 below). Notice that it is at its largest when bu is
large and ba is low. This is precisely when the disagreement on correlation is at its
19We prove that this is indeed the case in Proposition 10.
20Similarly to what we discussed in section 4.1, if condition (12) holds with equality, the slopes of
the IC and isocosts are identical and the problem has many solutions. In particular any point lying
between X and Y in Figure 12, presented in the proof, solves the principal’s problem. At this point
of indifference, we assume the principal sets up a DPE-DL contract.
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DPE
DL
Figure 3. In the Figure we represent conditions (11) and (12). Together
they define the area where a pessimistic underconfident agent is assigned
an DPE-DL contract. The dotted line crossing the quadrant represents
(2). In the Figure, we assume
(
Paa, Puu,Γ
H
a
)
= (0.7, 0.5, 0.6).
maximum since P˜aa is close to zero and P˜uu is at its minimum (which is also zero in
figure 5 and 6).
Before going ahead, notice that a key aspect of this contract relies in the full im-
plementation of both PE reports T and S. The disagreement about the correlation
between the signals allows the principal to design contracts that take advantage of
both information sources. This is confirmed in the next type of contract as well. From
the informativeness principle of Holmstro¨m (1979) (and its extension to models of risk
neutrality and limited liability due to Chaigneau, Edmans, and Gottlieb, 2014) we
know that, since T is a sufficient statistic for the pair T, S with respect to effort, the
fact that the contract fully implements both sources does not add any informational
value to the transaction. If anything it may even decrease the correlation between the
actual performance of the project and the resulting payment of w and c.
As we mentioned already, this paper shows how the classical result of Proposition
1 does not necessarily hold in the presence of an agent who (wrongly) believes signals
to be negatively correlated. This is originated by the disagreement on the direction of
the correlation.21 To see this, suppose the agent observes S = a and that he believes
signals to be negatively correlated. Clearly the agent would be very happy to hear the
principal reporting T = a, but what happens if the principal reports T = u? On the
one hand, the agent is upset because the principal deems his performance unacceptable,
21It would, in fact still hold if the true correlation were negative and the agent and principal agreed
on it.
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and therefore would like to punish her in general. On the other hand, however, the
agent expects T = u because she believes signals to be negatively correlated! So he is
less prone to punish the principal because he is more convinced that T = u is indeed
the truth. As already explained above, the principal takes advantage of this by setting
caa = cuu = 0. When the agent reports S = a, he knows that if the principal reports
T = a, he will get no compensation at all. This makes the agent (i) willing to report
S = a only when it is indeed true, (ii) less prone to punish the principal compared to
the positive correlation case. Under some particular levels of bias, this effect is so strong
that the presence of a deadweight loss case in the contract is not a necessary condition
for its implementation any longer. This is highlighted in the following proposition.
Proposition 9 (DPE-NDL Contract). If the agent is pessimistic, believes signals are
negatively correlated, has beliefs that violate (11) but satisfy
buPuuΓ
H
u − baPuaΓHa > PaaPuaΓHa − PuuPuaΓHu (13)
and
ba ≤ −Paa
(
Pua + buΓ
H
a
Pua(1 + ΓHu ) + bu
)
, (14)
then the optimal contract implementing high effort {wˆ′ts, cˆ′ts}t,s=a,u is given by:
wˆ′aa = 0 wˆ
′
au = cˆ
′
au wˆ
′
uu = 0 wˆ
′
ua = cˆ
′
ua
cˆ′aa = 0 cˆ
′
au =
∆V
∆Γa
ΓHu
P˜au−ΓHa
cˆ′uu = 0 cˆ
′
ua =
γ˜Haa
γ˜Hua
cˆ′au.
The DPE-NDL contract features:
(i) a wage and compensation that depend on both parties’ PE reports;
(ii) no deadweight loss;
(iii) a wage and a compensation only when the parties report misaligned performance
evaluations.
Proposition 9 shows that there exist DPE contracts which do not involve a deadweight
loss. Identifying the set of parameter values under which a DPE-NDL contract is
feasible and optimal is no easy task. In fact, none of the conditions behind it implies
any of the others for all parameter values. In Figure 4 below, we plot the area where
a DPE-NDL contract is feasible and optimal for
(
Paa, Puu,Γ
H
a
)
= (0.7, 0.5, 0.6).
While condition (13) and (14) play the exact same role for a DPE-NDL contract as
(11) and (12) do for a DPE-DL contract, the requirement of (11) to fail needs attention.
In the proof of Proposition 9 we show how condition (11) determines whether the
LLua or the TR
a
P is more stringent in problem (10). When (11) holds, the TR
a
P is
more stringent and the contract must feature a deadweight loss. When it fails, the
contract features no deadweight loss. In other words, condition (11) failing together
25
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
........
.......
......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
.......
bu
ba
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
..
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
.
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
..
...
...
.•
•
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
...
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
...
−Pua
.
−Paa
DPE
NDL
(11) (14) (13)
Figure 4. In the Figure we represent conditions (11), (13), and (14).
Together they define the area where a pessimistic underconfident agent
is assigned an DPE-NDL contract. The bullet indicates the point where
(14) becomes tighter than (13). The dotted line crossing the quadrant
represents (2). In the Figure, we assume
(
Paa, Puu,Γ
H
a
)
= (0.7, 0.5, 0.6).
with condition (13) holding, identify an area where an agent who disagrees with the
principal on the direction of the correlation of signals has a bias such that he does
not need to be able to punish the principal under any realization of T and S. It is
possible to show that the area where a DPE-NDL contract is set may not exist, under
some parameter conditions.22 This implies that the presence of a (particularly) biased
agent may not be enough for the principal to be able to set up a contract without a
deadweight loss.
The proofs show that in any portion of the feasible (ba, bu) space for a pessimistic
agent who believes signals are negatively correlated where none of the DPE contracts
is assigned, the BPE contract is assigned instead.
To conclude this section, let us state the promised Corollary to the Propositions of
section 4 and 5, showing that the (PC) is satisfied by all the contracts derived when
Assumption 4 holds.
Corollary 1. Given Assumption 4, all the potentially optimal contracts derived satisfy
the (PC) constraint, which is therefore slack.
22For example for the same parameters of Figure 4 but ΓHa = 0.25, DPE-DL is the only feasible and
optimal contract other than the BPE assigned to a pessimistic underconfident agent with beliefs that
violate (2).
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6. Other Forms Of Biases — Trusty and Skeptical Agent
In this section we study two further possible cases of agent’s type allowed by the
model. We call trusty, for his nature to agree with the principal’s view, an agent with
ba > 0 > bu. On the other hand, we call skeptical, for his nature to disagree with the
principal’s view, an agent with bu > 0 > ba. We show in the following how a skeptical
and a trusty agent may be offered only the type of contracts derived so far.
By studying the proofs of the Propositions proven so far, it is possible to see that none
of the conditions derived change in the presence of a trusty or skeptical agents. This
originates Figure 5 and Figure 6 where the entire parameter space (ba, bu) is partitioned
in the areas where each of the contracts derived so far is optimal. We present two
possible alternative parameter configurations. In Figure 5 we assume
(
Paa, Puu,Γ
H
a
)
=
(0.7, 0.5, 0.6). In Figure 6 we assume assume
(
Paa, Puu,Γ
H
a
)
= (0.6, 0.5, 0.35).
Figure 5 shows a set of parameters that allows for the possibility of a contract featur-
ing no deadweight loss to be assigned to a particularly biased agent. On the other hand,
Figure 6 displays a situation where the correlation between signals (and the probability
of the principal to deem the performance acceptable under high effort) are such that
there is no type of agent that would accept a DPE contract without a deadweight loss
and exert high effort. A further difference between the two figures is that in Figure 5
condition (12) does not bind when delimiting the area where DPE-DL is set, while it
does in Figure 6.
7. Welfare and the Social Value of Biased Agents
In this section we present a welfare analysis and prove formally that some types of
the agent’s optimism, and bias in general, may be socially desirable. That is, compared
to the BPE contract, they lead to new contracts that increase social welfare (intended
as expected wage payment plus expected actual compensation).
Since the BPE contract is the only contract of equilibrium for an unbiased agent,
we compare the welfare and efficiency of the new contracts to the ones of the BPE
contract. Further, since a APE is the only other potentially optimal contract for an
optimistic or trusty agent and the DPE contracts can only be set up for pessimistic or
skeptical agents, the analysis is separated accordingly.
As stated in the appendix, the APE contract is possible only when the (IC) constraint
is negatively sloped, the condition for which is given by ba ≥ Γa−Paa. Hence, we have
that c†au < c
∗
aa. The following Proposition compares the maximum compensations
available for different types of agents.
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?
Optimistic
Pessimistic Trusty
Skeptical
Figure 5. The Figure assumes
(
Paa, Puu,Γ
H
a
)
= (0.7, 0.5, 0.6). We high-
light in colours the areas where each contract derived so far is set opti-
mally. The BPE contract is set up in the areas without a coloured con-
tract acronym. The bottom dotted line crossing the graph split the space
in overconfident (below the 45◦) and underconfident (above it). The top
dotted line crossing the graph split the space between agents who believe
signals to be positively correlated (below the line) and those who believe
T and S are negatively correlated (above it) ?=DPE-NDL.
Proposition 10. Compensation c†aa is the maximum compensation available to either
an optimistic or trusty agent. Compensation cˆau is the maximum compensation avail-
able to either a pessimistic agent or to a skeptical agent if γ˜Haa > γ˜
H
ua. Otherwise it is
cˆua.
When the agent believes that signals are positively correlated and is optimistic
enough for the principal to assign him an APE contract, the latter features a large
compensation for the case of T = S = a, the probability of which, as discussed above,
is overestimated by the agent. This creates an opportunity for the principal to take
28
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Figure 6. The Figure assumes
(
Paa, Puu,Γ
H
a
)
= (0.5, 0.6, 0.35). We
highlight in colours the areas where each contract derived so far is set
optimally. The BPE is set up in the areas without a coloured contract
acronym. The bottom dotted line crossing the graph split the space in
overconfident (below the 45◦) and underconfident (above it). The top
dotted line crossing the graph split the space between agents who believe
signals to be positively correlated (below the line) and those who believe
T and S are negatively correlated (above it).
advantage of the agent’s bias.23 On the contrary, as we discussed in section 5.2 and
6, the agreements compensations (caa and cuu) in the DPE contracts are set to zero.
Because of the wrong direction of the believed correlation between signals by the agent,
the principal takes advantage of his bias by setting up a contract that features posi-
tive compensation and wages only in case of disagreement, which she knows are less
probable than the rest.
We start by comparing the BPE contract to the APE contract in the next Proposi-
tion.
23Hence the APE maybe connected to the idea of “exploitative” contracts in the literature on agents
with biased beliefs (Eliaz and Spiegler, 2006, 2008; Foschi, 2017).
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Proposition 11. Let E˜(·) denote the biased expectations of the agent. Given the BPE
contract {w∗ts, c∗ts} and the APE contract {w†ts, c†ts}, the following are true:
(i) E(w∗ts) > E(w
†
ts) whenever the APE is the contract of equilibrium.
(ii) E(c∗ts) = E˜(c
∗
ts) =
∆V
∆Γa
ΓHa .
(iii) E˜(c†ts) > E˜(c
∗
ts) always.
(iv) E(c†ts) > E(c
∗
ts) whenever
bu ≥ Puu ba(1 + Γ
H
u )− Pau
ba − PauΓHa
. (15)
Proposition 11 provides a set of intuitive conclusions. First of all, point (i) obviously
states that for the principal to be willing to switch to an APE contract from a BPE one,
it has to be optimal for her to do so. That is, she must be paying a lower expected wage.
Point (ii) follows from the fact that in the BPE contract the agent’s compensation does
not depend on the agent’s beliefs. Point (iii) shows that the agent would always be
happy to be assigned the APE contract instead of the standard one. This is because
the optimistic (or trusty) agent overestimates the chances of obtaining c†aa, that we
show above is the largest possible compensation available among the ones in the BPE
and APE contracts. Finally, point (iv) is by far the most interesting and important.
It shows that, even though the principal would like to take advantage of the agent’s
biased beliefs, under some conditions, the APE contract is not exploitative after all. If
conditions (15) holds, in fact, the contract not only allows the principal to pay a lower
expected wage, but it also features a larger expected compensation for the optimistic
(or trusty) agent. This sets the stage for the main result of this section.
Proposition 12. If the agent is optimistic (or trusty) and his beliefs satisfy (9) and
(15), the principal offers a contract that costs her a lower expected wage and grants
the agent a larger expected compensation. In this region, the agent’s bias is “ socially
desirable”.
In the proof of the Proposition we provide a formal argument to show that the region
where optimism is socially desirable corresponds (in shape) to the one in Figure 7 below
and that it always exists.24
We now carry on a similar comparison for the DPE contracts.
Proposition 13. Let E˜(·) denote the biased expectations of the agent. Given the
baseline contract (BPE) {w∗ts, c∗ts}, the DPE-DL {wˆts, cˆts} and the DPE-NDL {wˆ′ts, cˆ′ts}
contracts, the following are true:
(i) E(wˆ′ts) ≤ E(wˆts) < E(w∗ts) whenever the DPE contracts are optimal.
(ii) E˜(cˆts) = E˜(cˆ
′
ts) > E˜(c
∗
ts) always.
24The magnitude of the area, however, is purely indicative.
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Figure 7. The area inside the two curves features a contract with a
higher expected compensation and a lower expected wage compared to
the benchmark contract assigned to an unbiased agent. Inside this area,
the presence of an optimistic or trusty agent is socially optimal. In the
proof of Proposition 12 we provide a formal argument to show that this
area always exists and it is shaped as is displayed here. The value of
ba is also derived in the proof. This specific graph was obtained for(
Paa, Puu,Γ
H
a
)
= (0.7, 0.5, 0.6). Its shape, however generalises to all fea-
sible parameter values.
(iii) E(cˆts) > E(c
∗
ts) whenever (14) fails.
Point (i) states, once again, that whenever DPE contracts are assigned, they must be
optimal. There is a difference, however, compared to the case of the APE. It is trivial
to observe that E(wˆ′ts) ≤ E(wˆts) whenever (11) strictly holds, since the DPE contracts
feature the same payments but for wˆ′ua ≤ wˆua. As a matter of fact, the principal
would always like to set up the DPE-NDL contract rather than the DPE-DL one. The
former however, may not be feasible under some parameter conditions, like we show in
Figure 6. Point (ii) is due to the wrong believed direction of correlation between signals
by the agent. Given Lemma 10, we know that the DPE contracts feature the largest
possible compensations among the contracts set up for the pessimistic agent and for the
skeptical agent, while featuring zero compensation in the agreement states. The bias
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of the agent is, however, enough for him to believe that his expected compensation is
higher under a DPE contract than under the baseline one. This, once again, connects
to the idea of exploitation, where the principal takes advantage of the bias of the agent.
Point (iii) follows the same intuition behind point (iv) of Proposition 11 but provides
even more interesting insights summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 14. A DPE-NDL contract is never socially desirable. A DPE-DL contract
is socially desirable whenever it is optimal, feasible and (14) fails.
Proposition 14 states a very controversial result on the DPE-NDL contract. On the
one hand, the DPE-NDL contract features no deadweight loss. On the other hand,
with a DPE-NDL contract the principal takes so much advantage of the agent’s biased
beliefs that the agent never gains from switching from a BPE to a DPE-NDL contract.
The “exploitation motive” is so strong that the agent is , in fact, always exploited by
a DPE-NDL contract.
On the positive side, social desirability may take place when the DPE-DL contract
is assigned. When the principal is not capable of eliminating the deadweight loss, her
taking advantage of the agent’s bias may put the latter in a better position compared
to the baseline contract. To see that this is possible, consider Figure 8 below where we
assume
(
Paa, Puu,Γ
H
a
)
= (0.7, 0.5, 0.6). Figure 8 replicates the shapes of Figure 5. The
shaded area may be larger for different parameter configurations. Figure 9 represents a
case where a Pareto improvement is possible also for a pessimistic (and not skeptical)
agent.
To conclude this section we present a result on the deadweight loss of each contract.
Proposition 15. The BPE contract features the highest deadweight loss. That is∑
ts
(w†ts − c†ts)γHts <
∑
ts
(w∗ts − c∗ts)γHts∑
ts
(wˆts − cˆts)γHts <
∑
ts
(w∗ts − c∗ts)γHts .
Of course, the contract with the lowest deadweight loss is the DPE-NDL contract
since it features none. The DPE-DL contract features very little deadweight loss when-
ever the agent has a bias close to values that have (11) binding. Hence, which contract
between DPE-DL and APE features a smaller deadweight loss is not a trivial question
to answer. However, since these contracts are never assigned to the same type of agent,
it is also a relatively uninteresting question to look at.
Proposition 15 shows how the presence of a biased agent may be good for society
(and mostly the principal) in terms of wasting less resources compared to the baseline
case.
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Figure 8. The shaded area between the two curves features a DPE-DL
contract with a higher expected compensation and a lower expected wage
compared to the benchmark contract. Inside this area, the presence of a
skeptical agent is socially optimal. The Figure assumes
(
Paa, Puu,Γ
H
a
)
=
(0.7, 0.5, 0.6).
8. Concluding Remarks
This paper focuses on understanding the impact of workers’ behavioural biases on
subjective performance evaluation contracts. We have shown that while the benchmark
contract assigned to an unbiased worker may also be assigned to biased workers under
some conditions, three new contracts may arise in equilibrium. All of them share a
main driving force: the principal tries to take advantage of the bias of the agent by
altering the compensation levels compared to the benchmark case. These new contracts
always feature a lower expected cost of implementing high effort but not necessarily
a lower or higher expected actual compensation compared to the benchmark contract
(although the agent always thinks he is expecting to receive more). This implies that
under some condition the presence of a bias in the beliefs of the agent can generate a
Pareto improvement. Finally, we have shown how all the contracts derived decrease
the amount of conflict, i.e., deadweight loss, compared to the benchmark contract and
even can erase it completely when the agent is pessimistic. The latter case, however,
never generates a Pareto improvement and always feature exploitation of the agent.
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Figure 9. The area between the curve and the straight lines on the left
features a DPE-DL contract with a higher expected compensation and
a lower expected wage compared to the benchmark contract. Inside this
area, the presence of a pessimistic or skeptical agent is socially optimal.
The Figure assumes
(
Paa, Puu,Γ
H
a
)
= (0.55, 0.7, 0.5).
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9. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
To prove (i) simply notice that:
γjts = λ
jγGts + (1− λj)γBts
= λjPtsγ
G
t + (1− λj)PtsγBt
= Pts
[
λjγGt + (1− λj)γBt
]
= PtsΓ
j
t .
Now start from Assumption 2 and use (i) to obtain:
PaaPuu − PauPua > 0
PaaPuuΓ
j
aΓ
j
u − PauPuaΓjaΓju > 0
γjaaγ
j
uu − γjauγjua > 0 (16)
by positivity of ΓjaΓ
j
u. Finally to prove (iii), notice that Paa = 1−Pau and Pua = 1−Puu.
Substitute for the latter in Assumption 2 to obtain:
(1− Pau)Puu − Pau(1− Puu) > 0
Puu − Pau > 0
Similarly, substitute for Pau = 1−Paa and Puu = 1−Pua to obtain that Paa−Pua > 0.
Finally to prove (iv) note that
∆Γt = Γ
H
t − ΓLt
= λHγGt + (1− λH)γBt −
[
λLγGt + (1− λL)γBt
]
=
(
λH − λL) (γGt − γBt ) .
Therefore
∆Γa + ∆Γu =
(
λH − λL) (γGa − γBa )− (λH − λL) (γGu − γBu )
=
(
λH − λL) [(γGa − γGu )− (γBu − γBa )]
=
(
λH − λL) [(γGa − γGu )− (1− γGu − 1 + γGa )]
=
(
λH − λL) [(γGa − γGu )− (γGa − γGu )]
= 0.
Proof of Lemma 2
Simple checking yields:
γ˜jaaγ˜
j
uu − γ˜jauγ˜jua = (P˜aaP˜uu − P˜auP˜ua)ΓjaΓju
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which is positive when
P˜aaP˜uu − P˜auP˜ua = P˜aa(1− P˜ua)− (1− P˜aa)P˜ua
= P˜aa − P˜aaP˜ua − P˜ua + P˜aaP˜ua = Paa − Pua + ba − bu > 0.
Since by Lemma 1 Paa > Pua, the latter inequality is always positive for ba ≥ bu. For
values of bu > ba, it yields condition (2).
Proof of Lemmas 3 and 4
Rearranging the two (TRP ) constraints:
(wua − waa) ≥ (wau − wuu)γ
H
au
γHaa
(wua − waa) ≤ (wau − wuu)γ
H
uu
γHua
⇒ (wau − wuu)γ
H
au
γHaa
≤ (wua − waa) ≤ (wau − wuu)γ
H
uu
γHua
. (17)
Given Assumption 2, either all the brackets in (17) are 0 (case (i)), or they have
positive signs (case (ii)). This proves Lemma 3.
For Lemmas 4 follow the same steps with the (TRA) constraints to obtain:
(cuu − cua) γ˜
H
ua
γ˜Haa
≤ (caa − cau) ≤ (cuu − cua) γ˜
H
uu
γ˜Hau
. (18)
When the agent believes signals are positively correlated, i.e., γ˜Haaγ˜
H
uu − γ˜Hauγ˜Hua > 0, we
have:
γ˜Hua
γ˜Haa
<
γ˜Huu
γ˜Hau
.
Given this last inequality, either all the brackets in (18) are 0 (case (i)), or they have
positive signs (case (ii)). This proves Lemma 4.
Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose not, then wts = cts for all t and s. Given Lemma 3 and 4, then we have:
cuu ≥ cua ≥ caa ≥ cau ≥ cuu
Where the first and third inequalities follow from Lemma 4 and the second and fourth
follow from Lemma 3. Obviously for all inequalities to hold together we need
cuu = cua = caa = cau.
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This implies that E˜(cts|λH) = E˜(cts|λL) since the agent compensation is completely
independent from the realization of t and s. This of course violates the (IC) constraint
since
E˜(cts|λH)− V (λH) < E˜(cts|λL)− V (λL).
Proof of Lemma 5
When the agent believes signals are negatively correlated, i.e., γ˜Haaγ˜
H
uu − γ˜Hauγ˜Hua < 0,
we have:
γ˜Hua
γ˜Haa
>
γ˜Huu
γ˜Hau
.
That is the TRA becomes
(cua − cuu) γ˜
H
uu
γ˜Hau
≤ (cau − caa) ≤ (cua − cuu) γ˜
H
ua
γ˜Haa
.
Where either all brackets are 0 or caa < cau and cuu < cua.
Reducing the problem to (6)
Lemma 6 below states that an agent believing that signals are positively correlated
ought to be compensated in the “most positive” case, that is, when both principal
and agent report an acceptable performance. It also states that the agent obtains no
compensation when the principal deems the performance unacceptable and the agent
disagrees. Together with Lemma 8 below, Lemma 6 proves that the existence of a
deadweight loss happens only when the principal deems the performance unacceptable,
contrary to what the agent believes.
Lemma 6. If the agent believes signals are positively correlated, i.e. ( (2)) holds, then
any optimal contract implementing high effort features caa > cua = 0.
Proof. Define ∆γts = γ
H
ts − γLts and ∆γ˜ts = γ˜Hts − γ˜Lts. First we prove that ∆γ˜as > 0 and
∆γ˜us < 0 for any s ∈ {a, u} (it is easy to see that the same holds for ∆γas and ∆γus).
Notice that Assumption 1 is independent from Assumption 3. Therefore:
∆γ˜ts = γ˜
H
ts − γ˜Lts
= λH γ˜Gts + (1− λH)γ˜Bts − λLγ˜Gts − (1− λL)γ˜Bts
= λHP˜tsγ
G
t + (1− λH)P˜tsγBt − λLP˜tsγGt − (1− λL)P˜tsγBt
= (λH − λL)P˜ts(γGt − γBt ),
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which is positive at t = a and negative otherwise.25 Now we rewrite (IC) in the
following way:
caa∆γ˜aa + cau∆γ˜au + cua∆γ˜ua + cuu∆γ˜uu ≥ ∆V, (19)
Recall that any optimal contract with truthful reporting for an agent who believes
signals are positively correlated satisfies either case (i) or case (ii) of Lemma 4. Assume
case (i) of Lemma holds 4 then (19) becomes:
caa (∆γ˜aa + ∆γ˜au)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+cuu (∆γ˜ua + ∆γ˜uu)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
≥ ∆V.
Because of the negative sign of the second bracket, and since ∆V > 0 and cuu ≥ 0, the
above requires caa > 0 to always hold. Assume now case (ii) of Lemma 4 holds, for a
similar argument, we need at least one between caa and cau to be positive. If caa > 0,
the Lemma is trivially proven. If cau ≥ 0, case (ii) implies caa > cau ≥ 0. This proves
the first part of Lemma 6.
To prove the second part of Lemma 6, we suppose it is false, i.e., at optimum the
contract features cua > 0, and we prove that there exists a profitable deviation from it,
which contradicts its optimality. First of all, from Lemma 4 we know that cuu ≥ cua
and also caa ≥ cau. The proof now depends on whether cau > 0 or cau = 0.
Let cau > 0. Let the principal decrease both cuu and cua by  so that their difference
remains constant (so not to affect the (TRA) constraints). From (19) above we see
that both cuu and cua enter negatively in the LHS of the (IC). Hence decreasing them,
would relax the (IC) rather than tightening it. In particular, the LHS of the (IC)
constraint has increased by −(∆γ˜ua + ∆γ˜uu). Since we are in the case where cau > 0,
the principal can also decrease both caa and cau by . In this way the overall change in
the LHS of the (IC) is given by:
− (∆γ˜aa + ∆γ˜au + ∆γ˜ua + ∆γ˜uu)
= −
(
P˜aa∆Γa + P˜au∆Γa + P˜ua∆Γu + P˜uu∆Γu
)
= − (∆Γa + ∆Γu) = − (∆Γa −∆Γa) = 0
and therefore the (IC) binds again.
Finally, since both cua and caa have been decreased by , then the principal can
decrease also wua and waa by the same amount. This does not violate the the relevant
(LL) and holds their difference constant. Hence, it does not violate any of the (TRP )
constraints. This new contract {wts, cts}t,s implements high effort at a lower cost.
Hence, a contract where cua > 0 and cau > 0 cannot be the solution to the problem.
25For future reference, this also proves that, as long as ba and bu are both positive, ∆γ˜ta > ∆γta and
∆γ˜tu < ∆γtu for any t.
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Let now, instead, the optimal contract feature cau = 0 and define ∆cu = cuu − cua.
We divide the proof for this case in three steps.
Step 1
When cau = 0, the (TRA) imply:
∆cu
γ˜Hua
γ˜Haa
≤ caa ≤ ∆cu γ˜
H
uu
γ˜Hau
, (20)
where, since we are in case (ii) of Lemma 4 either only one of the two inequalities
holds as equality, or none. Suppose none of the two is strict, or the second one is, the
principal can decrease both cuu and cua by  keeping ∆cu constant, relaxing the (IC)
constraint. In particular the LHS of the (IC) has decreased by (∆γ˜ua+∆γ˜uu). He can
then decrease caa by δ ≡ (∆γ˜ua+∆γ˜uu)∆γ˜aa bringing the LHS of the (IC) back to its original
value. Clearly for some , this deviation can be done until the first inequality in (20)
binds. Finally, to see that this is optimal for the principal, notice that according to
the (LL) constraints, she can now decrease wua up to  and waa up to δ. By decreasing
both by min{, δ}, their difference does not change. Hence, (TRP ) constraints are not
affected while the objective function decreases. This implies that at optimum if cau = 0,
the first inequality of (20) binds.
Step 2
Given that ∆cu
γ˜Hua
γ˜Haa
= caa must hold at optimum if cau = 0, we now show that
the principal has at her disposal the following optimal deviation from a contract with
cau = 0. Let her decrease cuu by  and cua by 0 < . Then ∆cu has decreased by
( − 0). In order to keep ∆cu γ˜
H
ua
γ˜Haa
= caa, the principal decreases caa by ( − 0) γ˜
H
ua
γ˜Haa
. It
remains to check if this deviation can be made in such a way that it does not violate
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the (IC). The change in the (IC) is:
−(− 0) γ˜
H
ua
γ˜Haa
∆γ˜aa − 0∆γ˜ua − ∆γ˜uu
= −(− 0) γ˜
H
ua
P˜aaΓHa
P˜aa∆Γa − 0P˜ua∆Γu − P˜uu∆Γu
= −(− 0) P˜uaΓ
H
u
ΓHa
∆Γa + 0P˜ua∆Γa + P˜uu∆Γa
= ∆Γa
[

(
P˜uu − P˜uaΓ
H
u
ΓHa
)
+ 0P˜ua
(
ΓHu
ΓHa
+ 1
)]
= ∆Γa
[

(
P˜uu − P˜ua1− Γ
H
a
ΓHa
)
+ 0P˜ua
(
ΓHu
ΓHa
+ 1
)]
=
∆Γa
ΓHa
[

(
P˜uuΓ
H
a − P˜ua + P˜uaΓHa
)
+ 0P˜ua
]
=
∆Γa
ΓHa

(P˜uu + P˜ua)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
ΓHa − P˜ua
+ 0P˜ua

=
∆Γa
ΓHa
[

(
ΓHa − P˜ua
)
+ 0P˜ua
]
,
which is positive when:

(
ΓHa − P˜ua
)
+ 0P˜ua > 0.
If ΓHa > P˜ua, the above is always true. If instead Γ
H
a < P˜ua then the principal has to
choose  ∈
{
0, 0
P˜ua
P˜ua−ΓHa
}
.
Step 3
To conclude, given the decreases in the cts, the principal can now decrease wua up
to 0 and waa up to (− 0) γ˜
H
ua
γ˜Haa
. By an argument similar to the one is Step 1, she can
decrease both by the smallest of the two limits, decreasing the objective function. This
provides the desired contradiction and hence a contract where cua > 0 and cau = 0
cannot be the solution to the problem.
Finally, since a contract where cua > 0 and cau ≥ 0 cannot be a solution to the
problem it follows that cua = 0. This concludes the proof of the Lemma.
We can now move on to studying the principal’s incentives. When T = a, clearly, she
has an incentive not to reveal to the agent that she deems his performance acceptable,
otherwise she has to pay him a premium. At optimum, this makes (TRaP ) bind.
Lemma 7. If the agent believes signals are positively correlated, i.e. ( (2)) holds, then
constraint (TRaP ) always binds in any optimal contract implementing high effort.
Proof. Of course in case (i) of Lemma 3 the Lemma is trivially proven. Assume now
case (ii) of Lemma 3 holds and suppose (TRaP ) is slack. If wua = 0, by Lemma 3
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waa = 0 as well and case (ii) cannot happen. Now suppose wua > 0. We have cua = 0
from Lemma 6, and the principal can simply decrease wua until (TR
a
P ) binds. This
would relax (TRuP ), not affect (LLua) and decrease the objective function. This proves
the Lemma.
The following Lemma allows us to write all wts as a function of the cts. It also shows,
more formally, how the deadweight loss happens in the case of T = u and S = a only.
That is, the case where the agent believes performance to be acceptable, disagreeing
with the principal.
Lemma 8. If the agent believes signals are positively correlated, i.e. ( (2)) holds, then
any optimal contract implementing high effort features:
(i) waa = caa;
(ii) wuu = cuu;
(iii) wau = max{cau, cuu};
(iv) wua = caa + (max{cau, cuu} − cuu) γHauγHaa ;
Proof. First of all notice that, by Lemma 7, wua = waa + (wau − wuu)γHauγHaa . Hence, the
principal’s objective function in (3) can be rearranged as:
waaγ
H
aa + wauγ
H
au +
[
waa + (wau − wuu)γ
H
au
γHaa
]
γHua + wuuγ
H
uu
and further as:
waa
(
γHaa + γ
H
ua
)
+ wau
(
γHau +
γHauγ
H
ua
γHaa
)
+ wuu
(
γHuu −
γHauγ
H
ua
γHaa
)
where the last bracket is positive by Assumption 2. Furthermore, setting wua = waa +
(wau − wuu)γHauγHaa in (TR
u
P ) we have[
waa + (wau − wuu)γ
H
au
γHaa
]
γHua + wuuγ
H
uu ≤ waaγHua + wauγHuu,
which is equivalent to
wuu ≤ wau.
Hence, given the Lemmas so far, waa, wau, and wuu are only bound by wuu ≤ wau and
the three corresponding (LLts). This implies that waa, wau, and wuu will be set to the
lowest possible value. By Lemma 3 and in order to minimize the objective function,
waa = caa, wuu = cuu and wau = max{cau, wuu}, implying points (i), (ii) and (iii) of
Lemma 8. Point (iv) follows by substitution.
The next Lemma completes case (ii) of Lemma 4 by ranking cau and cuu. As ex-
pected, when the principal deems the performance acceptable, the agent may obtain a
compensation premium even when he observes S = u.
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Lemma 9. If the agent believes signals are positively correlated, i.e. ( (2)) holds, then
any optimal contract implementing high effort features cau ≥ cuu.
Proof. Suppose not. Then cuu > cau ≥ 0. By Lemma 6, cua = 0. Hence cuu > cua,
implying we are in case (ii) of Lemma 4 and caa > cau. By Lemma 8 we then have wuu =
wau = cuu and wua = caa = waa. This implies that cau disappears from the objective
function and from the constraints that affect the principal. She can, therefore, increase
cau and decrease the other levels of compensation (and therefore wage payments) in
such a way that the rest of the constraints are still satisfied. This operation can be
repeated until cau = cuu. Hence, the contradiction.
Given this, we can further decrease the amount of binding constraints by proving
the following:
Lemma 10. If the agent believes signals are positively correlated, i.e. ( (2)) holds,
then constraint (TRuA) always binds in any optimal contract implementing high effort.
Therefore:
cuu =
γ˜Hau
γ˜Huu
(caa − cau).
Proof. Let cuu = 0 then we are in case (i) of Lemma 4 and (TR
u
A) is trivially binding.
Suppose now that cuu > 0 and (TR
u
A) is not binding. We can then reduce cuu until
it binds. Given the proven Lemmas, the (TRP ) still hold, while (TR
a
A) and (IC) are
relaxed by this change. To complete the proof we need to check whether a decrease
in cuu would decrease the objective function as well. By Lemmas 8 and 9, we can
substitute for all wages in the objective function and find that the coefficient of cuu
becomes
(
γHuu − γ
H
auγ
H
ua
γHaa
)
, which is positive by Assumption 2. Hence, decreasing cuu also
decreases cost and it is therefore optimal for the principal to do so. This provides the
desired contradiction and proves that (TRuA) always binds at optimum.
This concludes the set of Lemmas yielding problem (6). Notice that, when plugging
in value from Lemma 8 the objective function in (5), simplifies to (6) divided by γHaaγ˜
H
uu.
This is however irrelevant for the minimization problem and therefore omitted. Finally,
to derive (7) and (8) , simply notice that (7) comes from the combination of Lemmas
9 and 10, while (8) derives from Lemma 4.
Optimism and Incentives. We can also prove the following two Lemmas to charac-
terize the impact of optimism on the (IC) constraint. This allows us to present the
rest of the results in a more intuitive way.
Lemma 11. If the optimal contract implementing high effort features caa = cau and
cuu = cua, then optimism has no impact on the (IC).
Proof. see the proof for Lemma 12.
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Lemma 11 simply states that if the agent’s compensation is independent of the agent’s
PE report, then the agent’s optimism over their joint distribution has no effect on the
(IC), and therefore on implementability of any level of effort.
Lemma 12. If the optimal contract implementing high effort features caa > cau and
cuu > cua, then optimism relaxes the (IC).
Proof. The (IC) ∑
ts
cts(γ˜
H
ts − γ˜Lts) ≥ ∆V,
can be rewritten as∑
ts
cts(γ
H
ts − γLts) + (caa − cau)(ΓHa − ΓLa )ba + (cua − cuu)(ΓHu − ΓLu)bu ≥ ∆V. (21)
Note that ΓHa > Γ
L
a and Γ
H
u < Γ
L
u . It follows directly from (21) that if the optimal
contract features caa = cau and cuu = cua, then optimism has no impact on the (IC).
This proves Lemma 11. If the optimal contract features caa > cau and cuu > cua,
then the second and third terms in the LHS of (21) are strictly positive and therefore
optimism relaxes the IC. This proves Lemma 12.
By Lemma 4, the agent knows that given what the principal observes, he obtains a
premium when he reports T = S. A positive ba (bu) increase (decreases) the agent’s
belief of both signals to show a (u). This means that, given effort, an optimistic agent
with beliefs satisfying (2) overestimates the chances of obtains the premium caa − cau
and underestimates the ones of obtaining cuu− cua. Since T = a is most probable when
he exerts high effort, the agent requires a lower incentive to exert λH . That is to say,
exerting high effort is part of his “strategy” to increase the chance of T = S = a.
Proof of Proposition 2
The inequality in Proposition 2 follows from the comparisons of the slope of the (IC)
with the slope of the iso-costs. This produces the following condition, that we simplify
as follows.
∆γ˜au − γ˜
H
au
γ˜Huu
∆γ˜uu
∆γ˜aa +
γ˜Hau
γ˜Huu
∆γ˜uu
≤ γ
H
aaγ
H
auγ˜
H
uu + γ
H
auγ
H
uaγ˜
H
uu − γ˜HauγHuuγHaa + γ˜HauγHauγHua
(γHaa)
2γ˜Huu + γ
H
aaγ
H
uaγ˜
H
uu + γ˜
H
auγ
H
uuγ
H
aa − γ˜HauγHauγHua
.
We start from simplifying the slope of the IC
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LHS =
∆γ˜au − γ˜
H
au
γ˜Huu
∆γ˜uu
∆γ˜aa +
γ˜Hau
γ˜Huu
∆γ˜uu
=
γ˜Hau − γ˜Lau − γ˜Hau + γ˜
H
au
γ˜Huu
γ˜Luu
γ˜Haa − γ˜Laa + γ˜Hau − γ˜
H
au
γ˜Huu
γ˜Luu
=
γ˜Hau
γ˜Huu
γ˜Luu − γ˜Lau
γ˜Haa − γ˜Laa + γ˜Hau − γ˜
H
au
γ˜Huu
γ˜Luu
=
P˜auP˜uuΓHa Γ
L
u
P˜uuΓHu
− P˜auΓLa
P˜aa∆Γa + P˜auΓHa
(
1− ΓLu
ΓHu
)
=
P˜au
(
ΓHa Γ
L
u − ΓLaΓHu
)
P˜aa∆ΓaΓHu + P˜auΓ
H
a ∆Γu
Notice that since ΓJa +Γ
J
u = 1 for any j = H,L, then we can substitute for Γ
H
u = 1−ΓHa
and ΓLu = 1−ΓLa . Also, as already proven, ∆Γa = −∆Γu. Hence we can further simplify
the LHS:
=
P˜au
(
ΓHa Γ
L
u − ΓLaΓHu
)
P˜aa∆ΓaΓHu + P˜auΓ
H
a ∆Γu
=
P˜au
(
ΓHa (1− ΓLa )− ΓLa (1− ΓHa )
)
P˜aa∆Γa(1− ΓHa ) + P˜auΓHa (−∆Γa)
=
P˜au∆Γa
∆Γa
[
P˜aa(1− ΓHa )− P˜auΓHa
] = P˜au
P˜aa − ΓHa (P˜aa + P˜au)
=
P˜au
P˜aa − ΓHa
=
Pau − ba
Paa − ΓHa + ba
.
The slope of the iso-costs, instead, is given by
γHaaγ
H
auγ˜
H
uu + γ
H
auγ
H
uaγ˜
H
uu − γ˜HauγHuuγHaa + γ˜HauγHauγHua
(γHaa)
2γ˜Huu + γ
H
aaγ
H
uaγ˜
H
uu + γ˜
H
auγ
H
uuγ
H
aa − γ˜HauγHauγHua
=
(Puu − bu)
(
PaaPauΓ
H
a + PauPuaΓ
H
u
)− (Pau − ba)ΓHa (PaaPuu − PauPua)
(Puu − bu) (PaaPaaΓHa + PaaPuaΓHu ) + (Pau − ba)ΓHa (PaaPuu − PauPua)
=
(Puu − bu)Pau
(
PaaΓ
H
a + PuaΓ
H
u
)− (Pau − ba)ΓHa (PaaPuu − PauPua)
(Puu − bu)Paa (PaaΓHa + PuaΓHu ) + (Pau − ba)ΓHa (PaaPuu − PauPua)
=
(Puu − bu)PauZ − (Pau − ba)W
(Puu − bu)PaaZ + (Pau − ba)W ,
where Z =
(
PaaΓ
H
a + PuaΓ
H
u
)
and W = ΓHa (PaaPuu − PauPua) = ΓHa (Paa−Pua). Hence
the inequality in Proposition 2 is equivalent to
Pau − ba
Paa − ΓHa + ba
≤ (Puu − bu)PauZ − (Pau − ba)W
(Puu − bu)PaaZ + (Pau − ba)W ,
or
(Pau − ba) (Puu − bu)PaaZ + (Pau − ba)2W
≤ (Paa − ΓHa + ba) (Puu − bu)PauZ − (Paa − ΓHa + ba) (Pau − ba)W,
47
or
(Pau − ba)2W +
(
Paa − ΓHa + ba
)
(Pau − ba)W
≤ (Paa − ΓHa + ba) (Puu − bu)PauZ − (Pau − ba) (Puu − bu)PaaZ,
or
(Pau − ba)
(
Pau − ba + Paa − ΓHa + ba
)
W ≤ (Puu−bu)
[(
Paa − ΓHa + ba
)
Pau − (Pau − ba)Paa
]
Z,
or
(Pau − ba)
(
Pau + Paa − ΓHa
)
W ≤ (Puu − bu)
[
ba (Paa + Pau)− PauΓHa
]
Z, (22)
or
(Pau − ba)
(
1− ΓHa
)
W
(ba − PauΓHa )Z
≤ Puu − bu,
or
bu ≤ Puu −
(Pau − ba)
(
1− ΓHa
)
W
(ba − PauΓHa )Z
. (23)
If the second term on the RHS of (23) is non-negative, then the inequality places no
new restriction on the space (ba, bu). However, if the second term on the RHS of (23)
is negative, then the inequality places a new restriction on the space (ba, bu). Since
ba ∈ (0, Pau] and ΓHa ∈ (0, 1), the second term on the RHS of (23) is negative when
ba ∈ (PauΓHa , Pau).
Further, notice that if ba < PauΓ
H
a , inequality (22) cannot hold.
Proof of Proposition 3
The Proof is divided in two parts. First we show that when ba = bu = 0, the slope
of the (IC) is never lower than the slope of the iso-costs. Then we derive the optimal
contract for the unbiased agent.
Using the algebra presented in the proof of Proposition 2, consider the slope of the
IC when the agent is unbiased:
Pau
Paa − ΓHa
This implies that the (IC) is negatively sloped if and only if ΓHa < Paa. First we
assume ΓHa < Paa and show that the (24) always holds. Then we move to the case of
ΓHa > Paa.
The comparison between slopes then becomes:
Pau
Paa − ΓHa
>
γHaaγ
H
auγ
H
uu + γ
H
auγ
H
uaγ
H
uu − γHauγHuuγHaa + γHauγHauγHua
γHaaγ
H
aaγ
H
uu + γ
H
aaγ
H
uaγ
H
uu + γ
H
auγ
H
uuγ
H
aa − γHauγHauγHua
(24)
Let ΓHa < Paa. We now rearrange the RHS, which is less nicely simplified.
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RHS =
γHaaγ
H
auγ
H
uu + γ
H
auγ
H
uaγ
H
uu − γHauγHuuγHaa + γHauγHauγHua
γHaaγ
H
aaγ
H
uu + γ
H
aaγ
H
uaγ
H
uu + γ
H
auγ
H
uuγ
H
aa − γHauγHauγHua
=
γHauγ
H
uaγ
H
uu + γ
H
auγ
H
auγ
H
ua
γHaaγ
H
aaγ
H
uu + γ
H
aaγ
H
uaγ
H
uu + γ
H
auγ
H
uuγ
H
aa − γHauγHauγHua
Before going ahead, notice that this proves that in the case of an unbiased agent isocosts
are always negatively slope. Carrying on we obtain
γHauγ
H
uaγ
H
uu + γ
H
auγ
H
auγ
H
ua
γHaaγ
H
aaγ
H
uu + γ
H
aaγ
H
uaγ
H
uu + γ
H
auγ
H
uuγ
H
aa − γHauγHauγHua
=
PauPuaPuuΓ
H
a Γ
H
u Γ
H
u + PauPauPuaΓ
H
a Γ
H
a Γ
H
u
PaaPaaPuuΓHa Γ
H
a Γ
H
u + PaaPuaPuuΓ
H
a Γ
H
u Γ
H
u + PauPuuPaaΓ
H
a Γ
H
a Γ
H
u − PauPauPuaΓHa ΓHa ΓHu
=
PauPuaPuuΓ
H
u + PauPauPuaΓ
H
a
PaaPaaPuuΓHa + PaaPuaPuuΓ
H
u + PauPuuPaaΓ
H
a − PauPauPuaΓHa
=
PauPua(PuuΓ
H
u + PauΓ
H
a )
PaaPuuΓHa (Paa + Pau) + Pua(PaaPuuΓ
H
u − PauPauΓHa )
=
PauPua(Puu(1− ΓHa ) + PauΓHa )
PaaPuuΓHa + Pua(PaaPuu(1− ΓHa )− PauPauΓHa )
=
PauPua(Puu − ΓHa (Puu − Pua))
PaaPuuΓHa + Pua(PaaPuu(1− ΓHa )− PauPauΓHa )
This implies that comparing the slopes boils down to:
Pau
Paa − ΓHa
>
PauPua(Puu − ΓHa (Puu − Pua))
PaaPuuΓHa + Pua(PaaPuu(1− ΓHa )− PauPauΓHa )
1
Paa − ΓHa
>
Pua(Puu − ΓHa (Puu − Pua))
PaaPuuΓHa + Pua(PaaPuu(1− ΓHa )− PauPauΓHa )
PaaPuuΓ
H
a + Pua(PaaPuu(1− ΓHa )− PauPauΓHa ) > (Paa − ΓHa )Pua(Puu − ΓHa (Puu − Pua))
Recall that Lemma 1 showed Paa > Pua and Puu > Pau.
PaaPuuΓ
H
a + PuaPaaPuu − PuaPaaPuuΓHa − PuaPauPauΓHa
> PuaPaaPuu − PuaPuuΓHa − PaaPuaΓHa (Puu − Pua) + Pua(ΓHA )2(Puu − Pua)
which, by simplifying and dividing by ΓHa on both sides, is equivalent to:
PaaPuu − PuaPauPau > −PuaPuu + PaaPuaPua + PuaPuuΓHA − PuaPuaΓHA
PaaPuu − PuaP 2au > −PuaPuu + PaaP 2ua + PuuPuaΓHa − P 2uaΓHa
Puu(Paa + Pua)−PuaΓHa (Puu − Pua)− PuaP 2au − PaaP 2ua > 0
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Now we substitute for Puu = 1− Pua and Pau = 1− Paa and we get:
(1− Pua) (Paa + Pua)− PuaΓHa (1− 2Pua)− Pua(1− Paa)2 − PaaP 2ua > 0
Paa + Pua − PaaPua − P 2ua − PuaΓHa (1− 2Pua)− Pua + 2PaaPua − PuaP 2aa − PaaP 2ua > 0
Paa + PaaPua(1− Pua − Paa)− P 2ua + PuaΓHa (2Pua − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Γ
> 0
Suppose first that Pua <
1
2
, then Γ < 0 and the LHS gets smaller the greater is ΓHa .
Hence, to be sure the condition holds, we set ΓHa = Paa, the highest possible value it
can get. This yields Γ = 2PaaP
2
ua − PaaPua. Hence the condition becomes:
Paa + PaaPua(1− Pua − Paa)− P 2ua + 2PaaP 2ua − PaaPua > 0
Paa + PaaP
2
ua − P 2aaPua − P 2ua > 0 (25)
Notice that if this holds for all Paa > Pua then so will the condition for the case of
Pua >
1
2
. In that case, in fact, Γ > 0, which means that the LHS would increase with
ΓHa . Hence, to check it holds we set it to 0. This would set Γ = 0 and yield a condition
looser than (25).
To see that (25) always holds, notice that the derivative of the LHS with respect to
Pua is given by:
∂LHS
∂Pua
= 2PaaPua − P 2aa − 2Pua = 2Pua(Paa − 1)− P 2aa
which is negative for all Paa < 1. Hence, the condition is monotonically decreasing in
Pua. We therefore check for the maximum value of Pua, which in this case is
1
2
. At this
value, condition (25) becomes simply
−2P 2aa + 5Paa − 1 > 0
By Lemma 1 Paa must be strictly larger than Pua. The second order equation above
always holds for Paa ∈ [12 , 1].
We are now left to show that when the (IC) is positively sloped the equilibrium
contract coincides with the one presented in the Result. To do this, let ΓHa > Paa.
Notice that we can rearrange the intercept to obtain:
∆V
(Paa − ΓHa )∆ΓaΓHu
which is clearly negative when ΓHa > Paa. Furthermore, given Γ
H
a > Paa the slope of
the IC is greater than 1 as long as
Pau
ΓHa − Paa
> 1,
or
Pau > Γ
H
a − Paa,
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or
Paa + Pau = 1 > Γ
H
a ,
which is true since ΓHa ∈ (0, 1). This result together with the fact that the iso-cost is
always negatively sloped for an unbiased agent imply that the optimal contract for an
unbiased agent with an IC with a positive slope is at caa = cau. To see this, notice that
the positively sloped (IC) and the 45◦ line cross only once in (cau, caa) space, that will
the point of optimal contracting.
Now we move to deriving the optimal contract. Consider problem (6) with ba = bu =
0. Given the proof so far, we can disregard (7) and let (8) and the (IC) bind. We
are then left with a system of two equations in two variables. The solution is trivially
obtain by substitution. Simply start from caa = cau and substitute it in the (IC) to
obtain
caa(∆γaa + ∆γau) = ∆V
which yields
caa(∆ΓaPaa + ∆ΓaPau) = ∆V
and
caa(∆Γa) = ∆V ⇒ caa = ∆V
∆Γa
= cau.
Wages are obtained by substituting the compensation values into the wages of Lemma
8. Notice that
wua =
∆V
∆Γa
(
1 +
γHau
γHaa
)
=
∆V
∆Γa
(
γHaa + γ
H
au
γHaa
)
=
∆V
∆Γa
(
PaaΓ
H
a + PauΓ
H
a
PaaΓHa
)
=
∆V
∆Γa
(
1
Paa
)
Proof of Proposition 4
To see that the contract completely resembles the baseline one, simply notice that
the two problems are solved in the exact same way, and that
c′aa =
∆V
∆γ˜aa + ∆γ˜au
=
∆V
∆Γa(P˜aa + P˜au)
=
∆V
∆Γa
Proof of Proposition 5
The proof of the proposition is divided in four parts. First we show that when either
or both the (IC) and the iso-costs are positively sloped, the optimal contract is the
standard one. Then we derive conditions for this case to happen. Third, we prove that
condition (9) implies all the conditions derived below as well as (2) — and hence all
the latter can be omitted from a graphical analysis — and we identify the shape of the
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area where the APE contract is set up (i.e. we provide an explanation to the shape of
Figure 2). Finally, we move to deriving the values of wages and compensations of the
APE contract.
Part 1. First of all, notice from (6) that an increase of caa always increases the expected
cost of implementing high effort. The effect of an increase of cau, however, is not
straightforward. If it is positive, then iso-costs are negatively sloped in (cau, caa) space
and costs decrease towards the origin. If it is negative, then iso-costs are positively
sloped and costs decrease towards the bottom right of the graph.
Suppose the latter is true. Since iso-costs are positively sloped in (cau, caa) space,
optimal contracts lie at point Y of Figure 1. Notice, however, that a further check is
needed here. Suppose the iso-costs are positively sloped. If their slope is larger than
1, then they are steeper than the locus of points where caa = cau. Hence, for any
given caa = cau = c, there would always exists a c
′ > c lying on an iso-costs further to
the right of Figure 1 satisfying all constraints and lowering costs. Hence, an optimal
contract would feature caa = cau = c→∞. In order to check that this cannot happen,
we study the value of the slope of the iso-costs when the latter is positive. From the
algebra in the proof of Proposition 2 we can get this value as:
(Pau − ba)ΓHa (Paa − Pua)− (Puu − bu)Pau(PaaΓHa + PuaΓHu )
(Pau − ba)ΓHa (Paa − Pua) + (Puu − bu)Paa(PaaΓHa + PuaΓHu )
which is trivially never larger than 1. Hence in equilibrium the baseline contract is set
up.
Now suppose that the (IC) is positively sloped. This implies that it requires caa to
be smaller than cau times a positive number. First of all, notice from the (IC) that
when it is positively sloped, its intercept is negative. Further, its slope is now given by
∆γ˜au − γ˜
H
au
γ˜Huu
∆γ˜uu
−∆γ˜aa − γ˜
H
au
γ˜Huu
∆γ˜uu
which is obviously larger than 1. Hence, the set of constraint compatible contracts
becomes the one highlighted in Figure 10.
Regardless of whether the iso-costs are positively or negatively sloped, the optimal
contract lies at point Y in the graph and replicate the standard contract.
Part 2. As already discussed, the slope of the (IC) is negative as long as ba ≥ ΓHa −Paa.
The condition for the slope of the iso-cost to be negative, instead, can be derived as
follows.
Consider the slope derived in the proof of Proposition 2 again, this time without
looking at its absolute value (i.e. we keep the minus in the front).
−(Puu − bu)Pau
(
PaaΓ
H
a + PuaΓ
H
u
)− (Pau − ba)ΓHa (Paa − Pua)
(Puu − bu)Paa (PaaΓHa + PuaΓHu ) + (Pau − ba)ΓHa (Paa − Pua)
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Figure 10. The shaded area represents the set of contracts satisfying
all the constraints of the minimisation problem when the agent believes
that signals are positively correlated and the (IC) is positively sloped.
It is easy to see then, that the iso-costs are negatively sloped when the numerator of
the above is positive. This happens when:
(Puu − bu)Pau
(
PaaΓ
H
a + PuaΓ
H
u
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Z
−(Pau − ba) ΓHa (Paa − Pua)︸ ︷︷ ︸
W
> 0
which yields the condition:
bu < Puu − (Pau − ba)W
PauZ
(26)
Part 3. In this part of the proof we show how, for ba ∈
[
PauΓ
H
a , Pau
]
, condition (9)
implies the negativity of the slope of the (IC), condition (2) and (26). We also show
how the area it delimits has a concave shape in (ba, bu) space and how it always lies in
the interval (PauΓa, Pau) on ba.
First of all, notice that the (IC) is negatively sloped if
ba ≥ ΓHa − Paa = ΓHa − 1 + Pau
and that
ΓHa − 1 + Pau < PauΓHa ⇒ Pau(1− ΓHa ) < 1− ΓHa .
Hence, when ba > PauΓ
H
a (which is necessary for (9) to have meaning) the (IC) is
negatively sloped.
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We now compare (9) to (2). First notice that (2) is linear and rearrange it as
bu ≤ Paa + ba − Pua.
Given the possible values of ba, the value of the RHS goes from Paa + PauΓ
H
a − Pau to
1− Pau = Puu. Its derivative in ba is obviously 1. Similarly, we can evaluate the RHS
of (9) at ba = Pau to see that it is simply Puu. This means that the two conditions
coincide at ba = Pau. Now notice that as ba → PauΓHa the RHS of condition (9) goes to
0 (since the second term explodes and eventually reaches Puu). We therefore have that
condition (2) lies above (9) at the two boundaries for the feasible interval of ba. We are
left to check that the two stay this way over the entire interval. To see this, we study
the derivative of the RHS of (9) and show that it is always positive and larger than 1,
i.e. larger than the derivative of the RHS of (2). This ensures that the two curves cross
only once.
∂
∂ba
[
Puu −
(Pau − ba)
(
1− ΓHa
)
W
(ba − PauΓHa )Z
]
=− −(1− Γ
H
a )W
(
ba − PauΓHa
)
Z − Z ((Pau − ba) (1− ΓHa )W)
((ba − PauΓHa )Z)2
=
Pau(1− ΓHa )2WZ
[(ba − PauΓHa )Z]2
which is always positive. To see that it is larger than 1 we calculate:
Pau(1− ΓHa )2WZ
[(ba − PauΓHa )Z]2
> 1
which yields
Pau(1− ΓHA )2W − b2aZ − P 2au(ΓHA )2Z + 2PaubaΓHa Z > 0.
The study of this inequality is not trivial. Consider first the derivative of the LHS with
respect to ba. It yields PauΓ
H
a − ba which is always negative. Hence, if the condition
holds at the lowest feasible value of ba, it holds for all values of ba. To see that this is
the case, notice that as ba → PauΓHa the LHS of the inequality above converges to:
Pau(1− ΓHA )2W − P 2au(ΓHA )2Z − P 2au(ΓHA )2Z + 2P 2au(ΓHA )2Z = Pau(1− ΓHA )2W > 0.
Hence the slope of the RHS of (9) is always larger than the one of (2). This implies
that the two cross only once and that (9) is always tighter than (2).
Comparing (9) with (26) is much simpler. It is enough for the RHS of (26) to be
larger than (9). This comparison corresponds to comparing the second terms of the
RHS of each inequality. Condition (26) is looser if
(Pau − ba)W
PauZ
≥ (Pau − ba)
(
1− ΓHa
)
W
(ba − PauΓHa )Z
54
which corresponds to
Pau(1− ΓHa ) ≥ ba − PauΓHa ⇒ Pau ≥ ba
which is always true.
To conclude this part of the proof we show that the RHS of (9) is concave in ba. To
see this consider the first derivative above,[
Pau(1− ΓHa )2WZ
[(ba − PauΓHa )Z]2
]
,
and notice that it is decreasing in ba. Hence, (9) identifies a concave area.
26 To see that
its lower bound is always larger than PauΓ
H
a simply substitute bu = 0 in the condition
to obtain
0 ≤ Puu −
(Pau − ba)
(
1− ΓHa
)
W
(ba − PauΓHa )Z
which is equivalent to
ba ≥ Pau (1− Γ
H
a )W + PuuΓ
H
a Z
(1− ΓHa )W + PuuZ
To prove our claim we then show that
(1− ΓHa )W + PuuΓHa Z
(1− ΓHa )W + PuuZ
> ΓHa .
With simple algebra it is easy to see that this condition boils down to ΓHa ≤ 1, which
is always true.
This concludes this part and proves that the area identified by the feasible values of
ba and condition (9) always features the APE contract. Its shape, furthermore, always
resembles the representation in Figure 2.
Part 4. Given all the above and Proposition 2 we finally solve problem (6) by setting
(7) binding together with the (IC). This yields the following system in two equations:
caa
(
∆γ˜aa +
γ˜Hau
γ˜Huu
∆γ˜uu
)
+ cau
(
∆γ˜au −
γ˜Hau
γ˜Huu
∆γ˜uu
)
= ∆V
caa =
(
1 +
γ˜Huu
γ˜Hau
)
cau
26Recall that the derivative is of the entire RHS not only of the second term.
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from which we obtain:
cau =
∆V(
1 + γ˜
H
uu
γ˜Hau
)(
∆γ˜aa +
γ˜Hau
γ˜Huu
∆γ˜uu
)
+ ∆γ˜au − γ˜
H
au
γ˜Huu
∆γ˜uu
=
∆V
∆γ˜aa + ∆γ˜au +
γ˜Huu
γ˜Hau
∆γ˜aa + ∆γ˜uu
=
∆V
∆ΓaP˜aa + ∆ΓaP˜au +
P˜uuΓHu
P˜auΓHa
∆ΓaP˜aa −∆ΓaP˜uu
=
∆V
∆Γa
1
1 + P˜uuΓ
H
u
P˜auΓHa
P˜aa − P˜uu
=
∆V
∆Γa
P˜auΓ
H
a
P˜auΓHa + P˜uu(1− ΓHa )P˜aa − P˜uuP˜auΓHa
= c∗aa
P˜auΓ
H
a
P˜auΓHa + P˜uu(P˜aa − ΓHa )
To conclude the proof, we obtain caa =
(
1 + γ˜
H
uu
γ˜Hau
)
cau from the above discussion, and
cau = cuu from Lemma 10.
Reducing the problem to (10)
Lemma 13 below studies the effect of optimism on the (IC) in this case. Intuitively,
given Lemma 5, the agent now overestimates the chances of obtaining premium cua−cuu,
and underestimates the ones of obtaining cau − caa. Hence, his incentive to exert λL is
higher, since T = u is more probable under low effort, and the (IC) tightens.
Lemma 13. If the optimal contract implementing high effort features caa < cau and
cuu < cua, then optimism tightens the (IC).
Proof. If the optimal contract features caa < cau and cuu < cua, then the second and
third terms in the LHS of (21) are strictly negative and therefore optimism tightens
the IC. This proves Lemma 13.
Lemma 14. If the agent believes signals are negatively correlated, i.e., ( (2)) fails to
hold, then the optimal contract implementing high effort features cau > cuu = 0.
Proof. Recall that any optimal contract with truthful reporting for an agent who be-
lieves signals are negatively correlated satisfies either case (i) or case (ii) of Lemma 5.
Assume case (i) of Lemma 5 holds then the IC becomes:
cau (∆γ˜aa + ∆γ˜au)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+cuu (∆γ˜ua + ∆γ˜uu)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
≥ ∆V.
Because of the negative sign of the second bracket, and since ∆V > 0 and cuu ≥ 0, the
above requires cau > 0 to always hold. Assume now case (ii) of Lemma 5 holds, for a
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similar argument, we need at least one between caa and cau to be positive. If cau > 0,
the Lemma is trivially proven. If caa ≥ 0, case (ii) implies cau > caa ≥ 0. This proves
the first part of Lemma 14.
To prove the second part of Lemma 14 we suppose it is false, i.e., at optimum the
contract features cuu > 0, and we prove that there exists a profitable deviation from
it, which contradicts its optimality. From Lemma 5 we know that cua ≥ cuu and also
cau ≥ caa. The proof now depends on whether caa > 0 or caa = 0.
Let caa > 0. Let the principal decrease both cuu and cua by  so that their difference
remains constant (so not to affect the (TRA) constraints). From the rearrangement
of the constraint above we see that both cuu and cua enter negatively in the LHS of
the (IC). Hence decreasing them, would relax the (IC) rather than tightening it. In
particular, the LHS of the (IC) constraint has increased by −(∆γ˜ua + ∆γ˜uu). Since
we are in the case where caa > 0, the principal can also decrease both caa and cau by .
In this way the overall change in the LHS of the (IC) is given by:
− (∆γ˜aa + ∆γ˜au + ∆γ˜ua + ∆γ˜uu)
= −
(
P˜aa∆Γa + P˜au∆Γa + P˜ua∆Γu + P˜uu∆Γu
)
= − (∆Γa + ∆Γu) = − (∆Γa −∆Γa) = 0
and therefore the (IC) binds again.
Finally, since both cua and caa have been decreased by , then the principal can
decrease also wua and waa by the same amount. This does not violate the relevant
(LL) and holds their difference constant. Hence, it does not violate any of the (TRP )
constraints. This new contract {wts, cts}t,s implements high effort at a lower cost.
Hence, a contract where cuu > 0 and caa > 0 cannot be the solution to the problem.
Let now, instead, the optimal contract feature caa = 0 and define ∆cu = cua − cuu.
We divide the proof for this case in three steps.
Step 1
When caa = 0, the (TRA) imply:
∆cu
γ˜Huu
γ˜Hau
≤ cau ≤ ∆cu γ˜
H
ua
γ˜Haa
, (27)
where, since we are in case (ii) of Lemma 5 either only one of the two inequalities holds
as equality, or none. Suppose none of the two is strict, or the second one is, the principal
can decrease both cua and cuu by  keeping ∆cu constant, relaxing the (IC) constraint.
In particular the LHS of the (IC) has decreased by (∆γ˜ua + ∆γ˜uu) < 0. He can then
decrease cau by δ ≡ (∆γ˜ua+∆γ˜uu)∆γ˜au bringing the LHS of the (IC) back to its original value.
Clearly for some , this deviation can be done until the first inequality in (27) binds.
Finally, to see that this is optimal for the principal, notice that according to the (LL)
constraints, she can now decrease wuu up to  and wau up to δ. By decreasing both by
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min{, δ}, their difference does not change. Hence, (TRP ) constraints are not affected
while the objective function decreases. This implies that at optimum if caa = 0, the
first inequality of (27) binds.
Step 2
Given that ∆cu
γ˜Huu
γ˜Hau
= cau must hold at optimum if caa = 0, we now show that
the principal has at her disposal the following optimal deviation from a contract with
caa = 0 and cuu > 0. Let her decrease cua by  and cuu by 0 < . Then ∆cu has
decreased by ( − 0). In order to keep ∆cu γ˜
H
uu
γ˜Hau
= cau, the principal decreases cau by
(− 0) γ˜
H
uu
γ˜Hau
. It remains to check if this deviation can be made in such a way that it does
not violate the (IC). The change in the (IC) is:
−(− 0) γ˜
H
uu
γ˜Hau
∆γ˜au − ∆γ˜ua − 0∆γ˜uu
= −(− 0) γ˜
H
uu
P˜auΓHa
P˜au∆Γa − P˜ua∆Γu − 0P˜uu∆Γu
= −(− 0) γ˜
H
uu
ΓHa
∆Γa + P˜ua∆Γa + 0P˜uu∆Γa
= ∆Γa
[

(
P˜ua − γ˜
H
uu
ΓHa
)
+ 0
(
γ˜Huu
ΓHa
+ P˜uu
)]
=
∆Γa
ΓHa
[

(
P˜uaΓ
H
a − P˜uuΓHu
)
+ 0
(
P˜uuΓ
H
u + P˜uuΓ
H
a
)]
=
∆Γa
ΓHa
[

(
P˜uaΓ
H
a − P˜uu(1− ΓHa
)
) + 0P˜uu
]
=
∆Γa
ΓHa
[
(ΓHa − P˜uu) + 0P˜uu
]
,
which is positive when:

(
ΓHa − P˜uu
)
+ 0P˜uu > 0.
If ΓHa > P˜uu, the above is always true. If instead Γ
H
a < P˜uu then the principal has to
choose  ∈
{
0, 0
P˜uu
P˜uu−ΓHa
}
.
Step 3
To conclude, given the decreases in the cts, the principal can now decrease wuu up
to 0 and wau up to (− 0) γ˜
H
uu
γ˜Hau
. By an argument similar to the one is Step 1, she can
decrease both by the smallest of the two limits, decreasing the objective function. This
provides the desired contradiction and hence, a contract where cuu > 0 and caa = 0
cannot be the solution to the problem.
Finally, since a contract where cuu > 0 and caa ≥ 0 cannot be a solution to the
problem it follows that cuu = 0. This concludes the proof of the Lemma.
Lemma 15. If the agent believes signals are negatively correlated, i.e., ( (2)) fails to
hold, then constraint (TRaA) always binds in any optimal contract implementing high
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effort. Therefore:
cua =
γ˜Haa
γ˜Hua
(cau − caa).
Proof. Suppose not. Given the Lemmas and that the TRaA is slack, proven till now the
problem that the principal faces is given by
min
{wts,cts}t,s∈{u,a}
waaγ
H
aa+wauγ
H
au + wuaγ
H
ua + wuuγ
H
uu (28)
s.t. caa∆γ˜aa + cau∆γ˜au + cua∆γ˜ua −∆V ≥ 0 (IC)
waaγ
H
aa + wauγ
H
au ≤ wuaγHaa + wuuγHau (TRaP )
wuaγ
H
ua + wuuγ
H
uu ≤ waaγHua + wauγHuu (TRuP )
caaγ˜
H
aa + cuaγ˜
H
ua ≥ cauγ˜Haa (TRaA)
cauγ˜
H
au ≥ caaγ˜Hau + cuaγ˜Huu (TRuA)
wts ≥ cts ≥ 0 ∀t, s ∈ {a, u}. (LLts)
and we can rewrite the TRP and TRA constraints as
(wau − wuu)γ
H
au
γHaa
≤(wua − waa) ≤ (wau − wuu)γ
H
uu
γHua
(TRP )
cua
γ˜Huu
γ˜Hau
≤(cau − caa) ≤ cua γ˜
H
ua
γ˜Haa
. (TRA)
The principal can then decrease cua by , such that the TR
a
A still holds, and cau and
caa by P˜ua. Since the difference cau − caa is constant, the TRA still hold. The IC is
invariant since its LHS has changed by
−P˜ua (∆γ˜aa + ∆γ˜au)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆Γa
−∆γ˜ua = ∆Γa(P˜ua − P˜ua) = 0.
We are now left to show that this is optimal for the principal. Notice that both cua
and caa have decreased. Hence, the principal can decrease both wua and waa by P˜ua.
This does not violate TRP and decreases the objective function, providing the desired
contradiction.
59
Given this, we can rewrite the IC as
caa
(
∆γ˜aa −
γ˜Haa
γ˜Hua
∆γ˜ua
)
+ cau
[
∆γ˜au +
γ˜Haa
γ˜Hua
∆γ˜ua
]
−∆V > 0
caa
(
∆ΓaP˜aa +
γ˜Haa
ΓHu
∆Γa
)
+ cau
(
∆ΓaP˜au − γ˜
H
aa
ΓHu
∆Γa
)
−∆V > 0
caa
(
P˜aaΓ
H
u + P˜aaΓ
H
a
)
+ cau
(
P˜auΓ
H
u − P˜aaΓHa
)
>
∆V
∆Γa
ΓHu
caaP˜aa(Γ
H
a + Γ
H
u ) + cau
[
P˜au(1− ΓHa )− P˜aaΓHa
]
>
∆V
∆Γa
ΓHu
caaP˜aa + cau
(
P˜au − P˜auΓHa − P˜aaΓHa
)
>
∆V
∆Γa
ΓHu
caaP˜aa + cau
(
P˜au − ΓHa
)
>
∆V
∆Γa
ΓHu
Lemma 16. If the agent believes signals are negatively correlated, i.e., ( (2)) fails to
hold, then LLaa and LLuu bind in any optimal contract implementing high effort, i.e.,
waa = caa and wuu = 0.
Proof. Consider the TRP
(wau − wuu)Pau
Paa︸ ︷︷ ︸
LHS
≤ (wua − waa)︸ ︷︷ ︸
middle term
≤ (wau − wuu)Puu
Pua︸ ︷︷ ︸
RHS
Start from LLaa. Suppose it does not bind. Then the principal can increase wau by
 and decrease waa by 1 ≡ PuuPua . The values in TRP change. The RHS increases by
1. The middle term also increases by 1. The LHS increases by 
Pau
Paa
. To see that the
LHS stays lower than the middle term notice that

Pau
Paa
≤ Puu
Pua
since
PauPua < PaaPuu
by Assumption 2. Now notice that this creates an overall effect on the objective function
given by
γHau − 
Puu
Pua
γHaa = 
1
Pua
(
γHauPua − γHaaPuu
)
= 
1
Pua
(PauPua − PaaPuu)ΓHa < 0.
Hence this deviation contradicts the optimality of waa > caa.
For the LLuu we follow the same logic. Suppose it does not bind. The principal can
decrease wuu by  and increase wua by 1 ≡ PauPaa . The values in TRP change. The RHS
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increases by Pau
Paa
. The middle term increases by 1. The LHS increases also by 1. To
see that the RHS stays larger than the middle term notice that

Pau
Paa
≤ Puu
Pua
as above. Now notice that this creates an overall effect on the objective function given
by
−γHuu + 
Pau
Paa
γHua = 
1
Paa
(
γHuaPau − γHuuPaa
)
= 
1
Paa
(PauPua − PaaPuu)ΓHu < 0.
Hence this deviation contradicts the optimality of wuu > cuu.
Proof of Proposition 6
At optimum it is of course true that either TRaP or TR
u
P bind, or both. Since, however
PaaPuu − PauPua > 0 and wuu = 0, the only way to have both binding would be for
wua = waa and wau = 0. From Lemma 14, however, we know that cau > 0. Hence, at
least one for the two constraint has to be slack.
Constraint TRaP binding. Suppose the optimal contract sets the TR
a
P binding. We
then have
wua = wau
Pau
Paa
+ caa
which results in the following objective function
caa
(
γHaa + γ
H
ua
)
+ wau
(
γHau +
Pau
Paa
γHua
)
.
Since wau has a clear positive effect on it and the only constraint left on it is LLau, we
have that wau = cau. We can further simplify the objective function
caa
(
γHaa + γ
H
ua
)
+ wau
(
γHau +
Pau
Paa
γHua
)
= caa
(
γHaa + γ
H
ua
)
+ cau
1
Paa
(
PaaPauΓ
H
a + PauPuaΓ
H
u
)
= caa
(
γHaa + γ
H
ua
)
+ cau
Pau
Paa
(
PaaΓ
H
a + PuaΓ
H
u
)
= caa
(
γHaa + γ
H
ua
)
+ cau
Pau
Paa
(
γHaa + γ
H
ua
)
=
(
γHaa + γ
H
ua
) [
caa + cau
Pau
Paa
]
which is equivalent to minimizing:
caa + cau
Pau
Paa
.
This implies that iso-costs have slope −Pau/Paa < 0.
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On the other hand, the IC is not necessarily negatively sloped. Its slope is given by
− P˜au − Γ
H
a
P˜aa
which is negative only if ba < Pau − ΓHa .
The reduced problem for this case is given by
min
{wts,cts}t,s∈{u,a}
caa+cau
Pau
Paa
(29)
s.t. caaP˜aa+cau
(
P˜au − ΓHa
)
>
∆V
∆Γa
ΓHu (IC)
cau ≥ caa (TRuA)
Positively Sloped IC. Suppose ba > Pau − ΓHa , the slope of the IC is positive and
smaller than 1. To see this notice that
ΓHa − P˜au < P˜aa ⇒ ΓHa − 1 < 0
which is always true. Hence the binding constraints can be represented in (cau, caa)
space as in Figure 11.
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
....
........
.......
...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
.......
caa
cau
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
cau = caa
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
......
......
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
...
(IC)
•
Y
...
....
....
.....
.
..
.
..
.
..
.
..
.
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
.
..
..
.
..
..
.
..
..
.
..
..
.
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
.
..
..
..
.
..
..
..
.
..
..
..
.
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
.
..
..
..
..
.
..
..
..
..
.
..
..
..
..
.
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
.
..
..
..
..
..
.
..
..
..
..
..
.
..
..
..
..
..
.
..
..
..
..
..
.
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
.
..
..
..
..
..
..
.
..
..
..
..
..
..
.
..
..
..
..
..
..
.
..
..
..
..
..
..
.
Figure 11. The shaded area represents the set of contracts satisfying all
the constraints of the minimisation problem when the (IC) is positively
sloped and the agent believes signals are negatively correlated.
In the Figure costs decrease towards the origin of the graph. The shaded area
represents the set of contracts satisfying all constraints and the optimal contract is
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therefore at point Y . At Y , cau = caa > 0 = cua. We derive the full contract below in
Lemma 17 and show that it is equivalent to the BPE contract.
Negatively Sloped IC. Now suppose that ba < Pau − ΓHa .27 Then the problem can be
represented as in Figure 12 below.
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.
Figure 12. The shaded area represents the set of contracts satisfying all
the constraints of the minimisation problem when the (IC) is negatively
sloped and the agent believes signals are negatively correlated.
Once again, costs decrease towards the origin, but whether the minimum point lies
at Y or X depends on the comparison between the slope of the IC and the one of the
iso-costs, as in the case of an overconfident agent. In particular, the minimum lies at
X if iso-costs are flatter than the IC. This happens when
Pau
Paa
≤ P˜au − Γ
H
a
P˜aa
PauP˜aa ≤ P˜auPaa − ΓHa Paa
baPau + baPaa ≤ PauPaa − ΓHa Paa − PauPaa
ba(Pau + Paa) ≤ −ΓHa Paa
ba ≤ −PaaΓHa (30)
Notice that −PaaΓHa < Pau − ΓHA . Hence (30) implies the negative slope of the IC.
27Notice that this restriction may already fail for an optimistic agent if Pau ≤ ΓHa .
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Lemma 17. If the agent believes signals are negatively correlated, i.e., ( (2)) fails to
hold, and (TRaP ) binds, then the optimal contract implementing high effort is given by:
waa = cau wau = cau wuu = 0 wua =
cau
Paa
caa = cau cau =
∆V
∆Γa
cuu = 0 cua = 0.
which fully replicates the BPE contract.
Proof. Simply substitute caa = cau into the IC and notice that
cau(P˜aa + P˜au − ΓHa ) =
∆V
∆Γa
Γu
implies
cau =
∆V
∆Γa
Γu
(1− ΓHa )
=
∆V
∆Γa
.
For wua notice that
wua = cau
Pau
Paa
+ caa = cau
(
Pau
Paa
+ 1
)
= cau
(
Pau + Paa
Paa
)
=
cau
Paa
Since for an optimistic type ba is never smaller or equal to −PaaΓHa , the BPE contract
is the only possible contract for an optimistic agent who believes signals are negatively
correlated, if the TRaP is binding.
No TRP constraint binding (no deadweight loss contract). Suppose, now, all
TRP are slack. Then clearly all LLts constraint bind since the principal wants to
decrease the expected wage paid as much as she can and they are the only constraints
preventing her to set the wts = 0. We have
wts = cts, cuu = 0, cua =
γ˜Haa
γ˜Hua
(cau − caa).
Then the principal solves
min
{wts,cts}t,s∈{u,a}
caaγ
H
aa+cauγ
H
au +
γ˜Haa
γ˜Hua
(cau − caa)γHua (31)
s.t. caaP˜aa+cau
(
P˜au − ΓHa
)
>
∆V
∆Γa
ΓHu (IC)
cau ≥ caa. (TRuA)
The sign of the slope of the iso-costs are not as trivial as above.
The objective function can be rearranged to obtain
1
γ˜Hua
caa(γ
H
aaγ˜
H
ua − γ˜HaaγHua) + cau(γHauγ˜Hua + γ˜HaaγHua)
which is equivalent to maximizing
caa(PaaP˜ua − P˜aaPua) + cau(PauP˜ua + P˜aaPua).
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Hence the slope of the iso-costs is negative if:
PaaP˜ua − P˜aaPua
= buPaa − baPua > 0. (32)
Now notice two things
(1) If the IC is positively sloped the optimal point would be at cau = caa, regardless
of whether costs decrease towards the origin (negatively sloped iso-costs) or
towards the top-left corner (positively sloped) in (cau, caa) space. This, however,
yields an unfeasible contract since cau = caa ⇒ cua = 0 = wua, which violates
the TRaP constraint since
cau
Pau
Paa
> −cau.
(2) If the IC is negatively sloped, the constraint of the problem are the same as the
ones represented already in Figure 12. When the iso-costs are positively sloped,
or when they are negatively sloped but steeper than the IC, the optimal point
would be at cau = caa(⇒ cua = 0 = wua) again.
These two observations imply that the only possible feasible contract for this case
is one where the iso-costs and the IC are negatively sloped and the former are flatter
than the latter.28 This happens when
PauP˜ua + P˜aaPua
PaaP˜ua − P˜aaPua
≤ Pau − ba − Γ
H
a
Paa + ba
,
(Pau + Paa)Pua + buPau + baPua
Paabu − baPua ≤
Pau − ba − ΓHa
Paa + ba
,
(Pua + buPau + baPua)(Paa + ba) ≤ (Paabu − baPua)(Pau − ba − ΓHa ),
PaaPua + buPaaPau + baPuaPaa + baPua + babuPau + b
2
aPua
≤
buPaaPau − babuPaa − buΓHa Paa − baPuaPau + b2aPua + baΓHa Pua,
PaaPua + baPua + baPuaΓ
H
u + babu + buΓ
H
a Paa ≥ 0
ba(Pua(1 + Γ
H
u ) + bu) ≤ −Paa
(
Pua + buΓ
H
a
)
which generates
ba ≤ −Paa
(
Pua + buΓ
H
a
)
(Pua(1 + ΓHu ) + bu)
(33)
28Notice that since we assumed that the TRP are slack, they cannot be considered as restrictions to
the problem. On the contrary when we assumed the TRaP binding in the previous case we made no
assumption about the LLts and therefore they were considered as potentially binding.
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that always fails for ba < 0.
29
Constraint TRuP binding. Suppose now we are in the case of TR
u
P binding. We have
wua = wau
Puu
Pua
+ caa.
In this case the objective function is given by
caa(γ
H
aa + γ
H
ua) + wau
(
γHau +
Puu
Pua
PuaΓ
H
u
)
= caa(γ
H
aa + γ
H
ua) + wau
(
γHau + PuuΓ
H
u
)
= caa(γ
H
aa + γ
H
ua) + wau
(
γHau + γ
H
uu
)
Since wau has a clear positive effect on it and the only constraint left on it is LLau, we
have that wau = cau. The reduced problem for this case is therefore given by
min
{wts,cts}t,s∈{u,a}
caa(γ
H
aa + γ
H
ua) + cau
(
γHau + γ
H
uu
)
(34)
s.t. caaP˜aa+cau
(
P˜au − ΓHa
)
>
∆V
∆Γa
ΓHu (IC)
cau ≥ caa. (TRuA)
We can immediately see that iso-costs are always negatively sloped.
Lemma 18. If the agent is optimistic and believes signals are negatively correlated,
then there exists no optimal contract implementing high effort where (TRuP ) binds.
Proof. Suppose not, and the TRuP binds. Suppose ba > Pau−ΓHa , the IC are positively
sloped and Figure 11 represents again the constraints of the problem. The optimal
contract would feature cua = 0 and the contract resemble the one of Lemma 17 with
the only difference that
wua = cau
Puu
Pua
+ cau =
cau
Pua
.
However, since Pua < Paa (from Assumption 2) this contract is clearly dominated by
the BPE contract in Lemma 17.
If instead the IC is negatively sloped, we are, once again, in Figure 12, where a new
contract may arise if iso-costs are flatter than the IC (if instead they are steeper we
have the BPE contract again, for the reasons just explained). As standard by now, we
are going to show that this case can never happen if the agent is optimistic. Iso-costs
29Notice that (Pua(1 + Γ
H
u ) + bu) > 0 is always true since
−Pua(1 + ΓHu ) < −Pua < bu.
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are flatter than the IC if
(Pua + bu)(γ
H
au + γ
H
uu) < (P˜au − ΓHa )(γHua + γHaa).
Notice that the condition becomes looser the smaller is bu. Since the agent believes
signals to be negatively correlated, from (2), bu must be at least Paa + ba − Pua =
P˜aa − Pua. Hence we check the above assuming the floor value of bu.
(Pua + P˜aa − Pua)(γHau + γHuu) < (P˜au − ΓHa )(γHua + γHaa)
P˜aa(γ
H
au + γ
H
uu) < (1− P˜aa − ΓHa )(γHua + γHaa)
P˜aa(γ
H
au + γ
H
uu + γ
H
ua + γ
H
aa) < (1− ΓHa )(γHua + γHaa)
P˜aa < Γ
H
u (γ
H
ua + γ
H
aa)
Paa + ba − ΓHu (PuaΓHu + PaaΓHa ) < 0
Paa(1− ΓHa ΓHu ) + ba − Pua
(
ΓHu
)2
< 0.
where we know that Paa > Pua by Assumption 2 and we can calculate
(1− ΓHa ΓHu ) = 1− ΓHA +
(
ΓHa
)2
> 1− ΓHa >
(
1− ΓHa
)2
=
(
ΓHu
)2
.
Hence the LHS is always positive for ba > 0 and the condition can never been satisfied
for an optimistic agent who believes signals are negatively correlated. This concludes
the proof.
Proof of Proposition 7
To see this consider the proof of Proposition 2 and notice that everything follows
through in this case as well until condition (22) which can never hold for ba < 0.
Proofs of Propositions 8 and 9
To prove the Propositions we build on the findings of the proof of Proposition 6.
First, we show that when (11) and (12) hold, the DPE-DL is the optimal contract
set up. Second we show that when (11) fails but (13) and (14) hold the DPE-NDL
is feasible and optimal. Finally, we show how Lemma 18 holds in this case too. The
proofs described here are true also for the results for a skeptical agent highlighted in
section 6.
Start from the case where TRaP binds and notice that (30) (which is the equivalent of
(12) and will be denoted 12 from here on) may now hold since the agent’s bias features
ba < 0.
From Figure 12 we see that when (12) holds, caa = 0, cua follows from Lemma 15
and to find cau we calculate
cau(P˜au − ΓHa ) =
∆V
∆Γa
Γu ⇒ cau = ∆V
∆Γa
Γu
P˜au − ΓHa
.
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Notice however, that given the value of wua, whether LLua holds or not is not straight-
forward. Hence, we have
wua ≥ cua
Pau
Paa
cau ≥ γ˜
H
aa
γ˜Hua
cau
Pau
Paa
≥ γ˜
H
aa
γ˜Hua
Pauγ˜
H
ua ≥ γ˜HaaPaa
PauP˜uaΓ
H
u ≥ PaaP˜aaΓHa
PauP˜uaΓ
H
u − PaaP˜aaΓHa ≥ 0
PauPuaΓ
H
u − P 2aaΓHa + buPauΓHu − baPaaΓHa ≥ 0
which generates (11).
Now suppose no TRP constraint holds and notice that (33) (which is equivalent to
(14)) may now hold. When it does we have the same contract of DPE-DL with the
difference that now wua derives from the LLua instead of the TR
a
P and therefore
wua = cua =
γ˜Haa
γ˜Hua
cau.
Further checks have to be carried out to be sure that the contract satisfies the TRP
constraints. We start from the TRaP and see that it holds as long as
wua >
Pau
Paa
wau ⇒ cua > Pau
Paa
cau
γ˜Haa
γ˜Hua
cau >
Pau
Paa
cau ⇒ γ˜
H
aa
γ˜Hua
Paa
Pau
cau > cau
γ˜Haa
γ˜Hua
Paa
Pau
≥ 1 ⇒ Paaγ˜Haa − Pauγ˜Hua ≥ 0
PaaP˜aaΓ
H
a − PauP˜uaΓHu > 0
which yields the opposite of (11).
68
Now we check for TRuP to hold
wua ≤ Puu
Pua
wau ⇒ cua < Puu
Pua
cau
γ˜Haa
γ˜Hua
cau <
Puu
Pua
cau ⇒ γ˜
H
aa
γ˜Hua
Puu
Pua
cau < cau
γ˜Haa
γ˜Hua
Puu
Pua
≤ 1 ⇒ Puuγ˜Hua − Puaγ˜Haa > 0
PuuP˜uaΓ
H
u − PuaP˜aaΓHa > 0
PuuPuaΓ
H
u − PuaPaaΓHa + buPuuΓHu − baPuaΓHa > 0
buPuuΓ
H
u − baPuaΓHa > PaaPuaΓHa − PuuPuaΓHu
which yields (13).
Before proving that no optimal contract exists where TRuP binds, notice that the
above contracts are feasible in completely distinct areas (since (11) separates them)
and that if all the conditions derived hold, they also “dominate” the BPE, they are
therefore optimal.
To conclude the proof we provide a different proof to Lemma 18. From the original
proof, notice that it is possible now for the iso-costs to be flatter than the IC. However,
we now show that (i) the resulting contract with caa = 0 and TR
u
P binding is feasible
only if (13) holds, (ii) it is always dominated by the contract without a deadweight loss
derived above when the latter is feasible, (iii) it is always dominated by the contract
with TRaP binding derived above when the latter is feasible. Hence, this new contract,
even if optimal given the assumption of TRuP binding, is never generally optimal and
can be ignored.
Let’s start from (i). Notice that the contract lying at point X of Figure 12 for this
case is given by
waa = 0 wau = cau wuu = 0 wua =
Puu
Pua
cau
caa = 0 cau =
∆V
∆Γa
ΓHu
P˜au−ΓHa
cuu = 0 cua =
γ˜Haa
γ˜Hua
cau
The calculations follow the same identical derivations of the case of TRaP binding but
for wua which simply follows from wua = cau
Puu
Pua
+ caa given by the TR
u
P .
Given this, constraint LLua holds if
Puu
Pua
cau ≥ γ˜
H
aa
γ˜Hua
cau
which generates (13) again.
For (ii) we compare the average wage payment in both contracts. Without the need
of any algebra, we notice that the no deadweight loss contract features wts = cts for
all t and s and the compensations and wages offered by the two contracts are identical
but for wua. Hence, the only way for the contract with TR
u
P binding to grant a lower
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expected wage payment than the no deadweight loss contract is for it to feature wts < cts
for some ts, which is infeasible.
Finally, for (iii) notice that the two contracts again feature identical cts and wts but
for wua. The contract with TR
a
P binding grant a lower average wage payment if
Pau
Paa
(
∆V
∆Γa
ΓHu
P˜au − ΓHa
)
≤ Puu
Pua
(
∆V
∆Γa
ΓHu
P˜au − ΓHa
)
which boils down to simply
PauPua − PuuPaa ≤ 0
which is always true.
This proves both propositions and holds for a skeptical agent as well.
Proof of Corollary 1
First of all notice that the only difference between a DPE-DL and an DPE-NDL
contract lies in the wages. Hence∑
ts
cˆtsγ˜ts =
∑
ts
cˆ′tsγ˜ts.
Therefore, to prove the Lemma, we need to check that
min
{∑
ts
c∗tsγ˜ts − V (λH),
∑
ts
c†tsγ˜ts − V (λH),
∑
ts
cˆtsγ˜ts − V (λH)
}
≥ u¯
Our welfare analysis in section 7 shows that
min
{
E˜(c∗ts), E˜(c
†
ts), E˜(cˆts)
}
= E˜(c∗ts).
Hence, it is enough to show that the BPE satisfies the PC. From the BPE contracts
we can derive:
E˜(c∗ts) = cau(γ˜
H
aa + γ˜
H
au)
=
∆V
∆Γa
(γ˜Haa + γ˜
H
au)
=
∆V
∆Γa
ΓHa
hence we simply check that
∆V
∆Γa
ΓHa − V (λH) ≥ u¯(
ΓHa
∆Γa
− 1
)
V (λH)− V (λL) Γ
H
a
∆Γa
≥ u¯
ΓLa
∆Γa
V (λH)− V (λL) Γ
H
a
∆Γa
≥ u¯
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which yields
u¯ ≤ V (λ
H)ΓLa − V (λL)ΓHa
∆Γa
and proves the Corollary.
Proof of Proposition 10
While c†au < c
∗
aa we also have that c
†
aa > c
†
au. Therefore the check for c
†
aa > c
∗
aa is
given by: (
1 +
γ˜Huu
γ˜Hau
)(
P˜auΓ
H
a
P˜auΓHa + P˜uu(P˜aa − ΓHa )
)
≥ 1
which is equivalent to(
P˜auΓ
H
a + P˜uuΓ
H
u
P˜auΓHa
)(
P˜auΓ
H
a
P˜auΓHa + P˜uu(P˜aa − ΓHa )
)
≥ 1
and to
P˜auΓ
H
a + P˜uu(1− ΓHA )
P˜auΓHa + P˜uu(P˜aa − ΓHa )
≥ 1
Which is always true since P˜aa ≤ 1.
To prove that max{cˆau, cˆua} > c∗au we simply check that
ΓHu
P˜au − ΓHa
> 1
which yields
ΓHa + Γ
H
u︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
−P˜au
which is always true.
Proof of Proposition 11
Point (i) is trivial. Condition (9) comes from the study of how to minimize cost and
it selects the optimal contract precisely on the basis of the lowest possible expected
wage. Since both contracts are available at the moment of minimization none of the
two can minimize costs when the other is optimal.
To prove point (ii) notice that
E(c∗ts) = c
∗
aaγ
H
aa + c
∗
auγ
H
au + c
∗
uaγ
H
ua + c
∗
uuγ
H
uu
=
∆V
∆Γa
(γHaa + γ
H
au) =
∆V
∆Γa
ΓHa ,
and
E˜(c∗ts) = c
∗
aaγ˜
H
aa + c
∗
auγ˜
H
au + c
∗
uaγ˜
H
ua + c
∗
uuγ˜
H
uu
=
∆V
∆Γa
(γ˜Haa + γ˜
H
au) =
∆V
∆Γa
ΓHa ,
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where we used the fact that γHta + γ
H
tu = γ˜
H
ta + γ˜
H
tu = Γ
H
t (which is easily proven from
Lemma 1 and Assumption 3).
Point (iii) requires us to calculate E˜(c†ts).
E˜(c†ts) = c
†
aaγ˜
H
aa + c
†
auγ˜
H
au + c
†
uaγ˜
H
ua + c
†
uuγ˜
H
uu
= c†au
[
γ˜Hau + γ˜
H
uu
γ˜Hau
γ˜Haa + γ˜
H
au + γ˜
H
uu
]
=
c†au
γ˜Hau
(γ˜Haa + γ˜
H
au)(γ˜
H
au + γ˜
H
uu)
=
c†au
γ˜Hau
ΓHa (γ˜
H
au + γ˜
H
uu)
=
∆V
∆Γa
ΓHa
P˜auΓ
H
a + P˜uuΓ
H
u
P˜auΓHa + P˜uu(P˜aa − ΓHa )
= E˜(c∗ts)
P˜auΓ
H
a + P˜uuΓ
H
u
P˜auΓHa + P˜uu(P˜aa − ΓHa )
.
Since ΓHu = 1−ΓHa , it is clear that the numerator is at least as large as the denominator.
This proves point (iii).
Finally, for point (iv) we need to calculate E(c†ts).
E(c†ts) = c
†
aaγ
H
aa + c
†
auγ
H
au + c
†
uaγ
H
ua + c
†
uuγ
H
uu
= c†au
[
γ˜Hau + γ˜
H
uu
γ˜Hau
γHaa + γ
H
au + γ
H
uu
]
=
∆V
∆Γa
γHaaγ˜
H
au + γ˜
H
uuγ
H
aa + γ
H
auγ˜
H
au + γ
H
uuγ˜
H
au
P˜auΓHa
P˜auΓ
H
a
P˜auΓHa + P˜uu(P˜aa − ΓHa )
=
∆V
∆Γa
γ˜auΓ
H
a + γ˜uuPaaΓ
H
a + γ
H
uuP˜auΓ
H
a
P˜auΓHa + P˜uu(P˜aa − ΓHa )
= E(c∗ts)
P˜auΓ
H
a + P˜uuPaaΓ
H
u + PuuP˜auΓ
H
u
P˜auΓHa + P˜uu(P˜aa − ΓHa )
.
Hence, to prove our result we are left to show that
P˜auΓ
H
a + P˜uuPaaΓ
H
u + PuuP˜auΓ
H
u
P˜auΓHa + P˜uu(P˜aa − ΓHa )
> 1
which is equivalent to
P˜uuPaaΓ
H
u + PuuP˜auΓ
H
u ≥ P˜uu(P˜aa − ΓHa ).
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This requires some calculations.
P˜uuPaa(1− ΓHa ) + Puu(1− P˜aa)(1− ΓHa )− P˜uuP˜aa + P˜uuΓHa ≥ 0
P˜uuPaa − P˜uuPaaΓHa + Puu − PuuP˜aa − PuuΓHa + PuuP˜aaΓHa − P˜uuP˜aa + P˜uuΓHa ≥ 0
P˜uuPaa − PuuP˜aa − P˜uuP˜aa − PuuΓHa + P˜uuΓHa − P˜uuPaaΓHa + PuuP˜aaΓHa + Puu ≥ 0
From here, we substitute for some of the P˜ts to get
(P˜uuPaa − PuuP˜aa − P˜uuPaa − P˜uuba) + (−PuuΓHa + PuuΓHa − buΓHa )+
+(−PuuPaaΓHa + buPaaΓHa + PuuPaaΓHa + PuubaΓHa ) + Puu ≥ 0
and finally
−PuuP˜aa − P˜uuba − buΓHa + PuubaΓHa + buPaaΓHa + Puu ≥ 0
−PuuPaa − Puuba − Puuba + buba − buΓHa + PuubaΓHa + buPaaΓHa + Puu ≥ 0
−Puu (Paa + ba)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−P˜au
−Puuba + buba − buΓHa + PuubaΓHa + buPaaΓHa + Puu ≥ 0
bu
(
ba − Γa + PaaΓHa
)
+ Puu
[
1− ba(1− ΓHa )− (1− P˜au)
]
≥ 0
bu
(
ba − PauΓHa
) ≥ Puu [ba(1− ΓHa ) + 1− P˜au − 1]
bu
(
ba − PauΓHa
) ≥ Puu [ba(1− ΓHa )− Pau + ba]
bu
(
ba − PauΓHa
) ≥ Puu [baΓHu − Pau + ba]
bu
(
ba − PauΓHa
) ≥ Puu (ba(1 + ΓHu )− Pau)
Notice now that the APE requires ba > PauΓa as described in the proof of Proposition
5. This means that the LHS is always positive and we can therefore derive the condition
presented in the Result.
Proof of Proposition 12
First we study condition (15).
bu ≥ Puu ba(1 + Γ
H
u )− Pau
ba − PauΓHa
At bu = 0, condition (15) corresponds to ba < Pau/(1 + Γ
H
u ). Hence, Pau/(1 + Γ
H
u ) is
the intercept of the RHS of the condition with the x-axis. Let
Pau/(1 + Γu) ≡ ba.
To show that this condition is compatible with (9), and therefore that an area where
optimism is socially desirable always exists, we need to show that ba is larger than the
intercept of condition (9) (holding with equality) with the x-axis. We start from the
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latter, which we already calculated in Part 3 of the proof to Proposition 5.
ba = Pau
(1− ΓHa )W + PuuΓHa Z
(1− ΓHa )W + PuuZ
.
We then need to show that
Pau
(1− ΓHa )W + PuuΓHa Z
(1− ΓHa )W + PuuZ
<
Pau
(1 + ΓHu )
.
To do this, we get
(1− ΓHa )W + PuuZ > (1− ΓHa )W + PuuΓHa Z + (1− ΓHa )WΓHu + PuuΓHa ZΓHu
Puu(1− ΓHa )Z − (1− ΓHa )WΓHu − PuuΓHa ΓHu Z > 0
PuuΓ
H
u Z −W (ΓHu )2 − PuuΓHa ΓHu Z > 0
PuuΓ
H
u Z (1− ΓHa )︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΓHu
−W (ΓHu )2 > 0 ⇒ PuuZ −W > 0
We can now expand Z and W to get
PuuZ −W > 0
PuuPaaΓ
H
a + PuuPuaΓ
H
u − ΓHa Paa + ΓHa Pua > 0
(Puu − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−Pua
PaaΓ
H
a + PuuPuaΓ
H
u + Γ
H
a Pua > 0
− PaaΓHa + PuuΓHu + ΓHa > 0
PuuΓ
H
u + Γ
H
a (1− Paa) > 0
which is obviously always true. This proves that an area where optimism is socially
desirable always exists, at least for bu = 0. We now show that this area also exists for
positive values of bu. To do this, consider the shape of condition (9) as in Figure 5.
Since we know that the curve of condition (9) intercepts the x-axis before (15), it is
enough to show that the loci of points where the two conditions hold cross only once
in (ba, bu) space and they do so at (ba, bu) = (Pau, Puu). To formally prove the shape of
Figure 7 we are also going to show that the locus where (15) binds is concave in (ba, bu)
space.
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Take the two conditions binding and equate the two RHSs to get:
Puu
ba(1 + Γ
H
u )− Pau
ba − PauΓHa
= Puu −
(Pau − ba)
(
1− ΓHa
)
W
(ba − PauΓHa )Z
Puu
[
(ba(1 + Γ
H
u )− Pau)Z − (ba − PauΓHa )Z
]
= − (Pau − ba)
(
1− ΓHa
)
W
Puu
[
baΓ
H
u Z − PauΓHu Z
]
= − (Pau − ba)
(
1− ΓHa
)
W
Puu(ba − Pau)ΓHu Z = − (Pau − ba)
(
1− ΓHa
)
W
(PuuZ −W )(ba − Pau) = 0
(PuuPaaΓ
H
a + PuuPuaΓ
H
u − PaaΓHa + PuaΓHa )(ba − Pau) = 0
((Puu − 1)PaaΓHa + Pua(PuuΓHu + ΓHa ))(ba − Pau) = 0
Pua(−PaaΓHa + PuuΓHu + ΓHa )(ba − Pau) = 0
Pua(PauΓ
H
a + PuuΓ
H
u )(ba − Pau) = 0
which holds only if ba = Pau.When plugged into any of the two conditions we get that
the corresponding value is bu = Puu. Hence the two curves cross only at that point.
This concludes the proof of the Proposition. To show that the RHS of (15) is concave
simply calculate the first derivative and obtain:
∂
∂ba
[
Puu
ba(1 + Γ
H
u )− Pau
ba − PauΓHa
]
=Puu
ba(1 + Γ
H
u )− PauΓHa (1 + ΓHu )− ba(1 + ΓHu ) + Pau
(ba − PauΓHa )2
=PuuPau
1− ΓHa (1 + ΓHu )
(ba − PauΓHa )2
=PuuPau
1− 2ΓHa + (ΓHa )2
(ba − PauΓHa )2
= PuuPau
(1− ΓHa )2
(ba − PauΓHa )2
> 0.
The second derivative is obviously negative since ba only appears at the denominator.
Proof of Proposition 13
Point (i) follows from the fact that the DPE contracts feature the same wage but for
the ts = ua case and the optimality of the DPE contracts (as in Proposition 11).
Point (ii)’s equality is straightforward. To see why the inequality is true we calculate
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E˜(cˆts) =cˆaaγ˜
H
aa + cˆauγ˜
H
au + cˆuaγ˜
H
ua + cˆuuγ˜
H
uu
=cˆau
(
γ˜Hau +
γ˜Haa
γ˜Hua
γ˜Hua
)
=cˆau
(
γ˜Hau + γ˜
H
aa
)
= cˆauΓ
H
a
=
∆V
∆ΓHa
ΓHa Γ
H
u
P˜au − ΓHa
.
Hence to prove point (ii) we simply need
ΓHu
P˜au − ΓHa
> 1 ⇒ ΓHa + ΓHu︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
−P˜au > 0
which always holds.
Finally, to prove point (iii) we calculate
E(cˆts) =cˆaaγ
H
aa + cˆauγ
H
au + cˆuaγ
H
ua + cˆuuγ
H
uu
=cˆau
(
γHau +
γ˜Haa
γ˜Hua
γHua
)
=
∆V
∆ΓHa
γHauγ˜
H
ua + γ˜
H
aaγ
H
ua
P˜auP˜ua − ΓHa P˜ua
.
Hence to prove point (iii) we need
γHauγ˜
H
ua + γ˜
H
aaγ
H
ua
P˜auP˜ua − ΓHa P˜ua
> ΓHa
γHauγ˜
H
ua + γ˜
H
aaγ
H
ua > Γ
H
a (P˜auP˜ua − ΓHa P˜ua)
PauP˜uaΓ
H
a Γ
H
u + P˜aaPuaΓ
H
a Γ
H
u > Γ
H
a (P˜auP˜ua − ΓHa P˜ua)
PauP˜uaΓ
H
u + P˜aaPuaΓ
H
u − P˜auP˜ua + ΓHa P˜ua > 0
PauPuaΓ
H
u + PaaPuaΓ
H
u︸ ︷︷ ︸
PuaΓHu
−PauPua + ΓHa Pua
+buPauΓ
H
u + baPuaΓ
H
u + baPua − buPau + babu + buΓHa > 0
Pua(Γ
H
u − Pau + ΓHa ) + bu(PauΓHu − Pau + ΓHa ) + ba(PuaΓHu + Pua + bu) > 0
Pua(1− Pau) + bu
Pau (ΓHu − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΓHa
+ΓHa
+ ba (Pua(1 + ΓHu ) + bu) > 0
PuaPaa + buΓ
H
a (1− Pau) + ba
(
Pua(1 + Γ
H
u ) + bu
)
> 0
ba
(
Pua(1 + Γ
H
u ) + bu
)
> −PuaPaa − buΓHa Paa
which generates the opposite of (14).
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Proof of Proposition 14
The first statement is trivial since the DPE-NDL contract is optimal only if (14)
and it would be socially desirable only when (14) fails. Hence, the DPE-NDL contract
never Pareto improves over the BPE contract when it is assigned.
The second statement follows from point (iii) of Proposition 13.
Proof of Proposition 15
The deadweight loss under the standard and APE contracts is equal to
∑
ts(w
∗
ts −
c∗ts)γ
H
ts = (w
∗
ua − c∗ua)γHua and
∑
ts(w
†
ts − c†ts)γHts = (w†ua − c†ua)γHua, respectively. Since
c∗ua = c
†
ua = 0, the deadweight loss is smaller under the APE contract if
w∗ua > w
†
ua
c∗aa
Paa
> c†aa
∆V
∆Γa
1
Paa
>
∆V
∆Γa
P˜auΓ
H
a
P˜auΓHa + P˜uu(P˜aa − ΓHa )
(
1 +
γ˜Huu
γ˜Hau
)
1 > Paa
P˜auΓ
H
a
P˜auΓHa + P˜uu(P˜aa − ΓHa )
P˜auΓ
H
a + P˜uuΓ
H
u
P˜auΓHa
P˜auΓ
H
a + P˜uu(P˜aa − ΓHa ) > PaaP˜auΓHa + PaaP˜uuΓHu
(1− Paa)P˜auΓHa + P˜uuP˜aa − P˜uuΓHa − PaaP˜uuΓHu > 0
PauP˜auΓ
H
a + P˜uu
[
P˜aa − ΓHa − Paa(1− ΓHa )
]
> 0
PauP˜auΓ
H
a + P˜uu(Paa + ba − ΓHa − Paa + PaaΓHa ) > 0
PauP˜auΓ
H
a + P˜uu
[
ba − (1− Paa)ΓHa
]
> 0
Pau(Pau − ba)ΓHa + P˜uu(ba − PauΓHa ) > 0,
which is always true since in the APE contract we have ba ∈ (PauΓHa , Pau].
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Similarly, the deadweight loss under the DPE-DL contract is given by∑
ts
(wˆts − cˆts) γHts
= (wˆua − cˆua)γHua
=
(
Pau
Paa
− γ˜
H
aa
γ˜Hua
)
cˆau
=
(
Pau
Paa
− γ˜
H
aa
γ˜Hua
)
∆V
∆ΓA
ΓHu
P˜au − ΓHA
=
(
Pauγ˜
H
ua − Paaγ˜Haa
PaaP˜uaΓHu
)
∆V
∆ΓA
ΓHu
P˜au − ΓHA
=
∆V
∆ΓA
Pauγ˜
H
ua − Paaγ˜Haa
PaaP˜ua
(
P˜au − ΓHA
) .
To see that the deadweight loss in a DPE-DL contract is always lower than that in a
BPE contract when the DPE-DL one is optimal we calculate
∆V
∆Γa
1
Paa
>
∆V
∆ΓA
Pauγ˜
H
ua − Paaγ˜Haa
PaaP˜ua
(
P˜au − ΓHA
)
1 >
Pauγ˜
H
ua − Paaγ˜Haa
P˜ua
(
P˜au − ΓHA
)
Pauγ˜
H
ua − Paaγ˜Haa − P˜uaP˜au + P˜uaΓHA < 0
PauP˜uaΓ
H
u − PaaP˜aaΓHa − P˜uaP˜au + P˜uaΓHA < 0
PauPuaΓ
H
u − PaaPaaΓHa − PuaPau + PuaΓHA + buPauΓHu − baPaaΓHa − buPau + baPua + buba + buΓHa < 0
PauPua (Γ
H
u − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−ΓHa
−PaaPaaΓHa + PuaΓHA + bu(PauΓHu − Pau + ΓHa ) + ba(Pua + bu − PaaΓHa ) < 0
PuaΓ
H
a (1− Pau)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Paa
−PaaPaaΓHa + bu(Pau(ΓHu − 1) + ΓHa ) + ba(P˜ua − PaaΓHa ) < 0
PaaΓ
H
a (Pua − Paa) + buΓHa (1− Pau) + ba(P˜ua − PaaΓHa ) < 0
PaaΓ
H
a (Pua − Paa + bu) + ba(P˜ua − PaaΓHa ) < 0
PaaΓ
H
a (P˜ua − Paa) + ba(P˜ua − PaaΓHa ) < 0.
Recall that for the DPE-DL contract to be optimal ba ∈
[−Paa,−PaaΓHa ]. Since the
above inequality is linear in ba, but its effect on the LHS is not straightforward, we can
check that it holds at the extremes of the interval. At ba = −Paa we have
−PaaP˜ua +P 2aaΓHa +PaaP˜uaΓHa −P 2aaΓHa = −PaaP˜ua +PaaP˜uaΓHa = PaaP˜ua(ΓHa − 1) < 0.
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At ba = −PaaΓHa we have
−PaaP˜uaΓHa +P 2aa(ΓHa )2 +PaaP˜uaΓHa −P 2aaΓHa = P 2aa(ΓHa )2−P 2aaΓHa = P 2aaΓHa (ΓHa −1) < 0.
This proves that the DPE-DL contract always features a smaller deadweight loss than
the BPE contract.
